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INTRODUCTION

What is a human being? Legal theorists must, perforce, answer this question: jurisprudence, after all, is about human beings.
The task has not proven to be divisive. In fact, virtually all modern
American legal theorists, like most modern moral and political philosophers, either explicitly or implicitly embrace what I will call
the "separation thesis" about what it means to be a human being:
a "human being," whatever else he is, is physically separate from
all other human beings. I am one human being and you are another, and that distinction between you and me is central to the
meaning of the phrase "human being." Individuals are, in the
words of one commentator, "distinct and not essentially connected
with one another."' We are each physically "boundaried"-this is
the trivially true meaning of the claim that we are all individuals.
In Robert Nozick's telling phrase, the "root idea" of any acceptt Professor of Law, The University of Maryland. I would like to thank Mike Kelly,
Paul Brest, Lynne Henderson, Robert B. Green, Jana Singer, Peter Quint, Cass Sunstein,
Richard Posner, Erin Enright, Quincie Hopkins, Tom Grey, the participants in the Wisconsin 1987 Feminism and Legal Theory Summer Workshop, and the Georgetown Feminist
Legal Theory Workshop for their comments on early drafts of this article. I am also indebted to Marcy Wilder (Stanford Law School '88) for helping me to clarify and develop the
critique of the critical legal scholarship discussed in this article.
I Naomi Scheman, Individualism and the Objects of Psychology, in Sandra Harding
and Merrill B. Hintikka, eds., Discovering Reality 225, 237 (1983).
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able moral or political philosophy is that "there are individuals
with separate lives."'2 Although Nozick goes on to derive from this
insight an argument for the minimal state, the separation thesis is
hardly confined to the libertarian right. According to Roberto Unger, premiere spokesperson for the communitarian left, "[t]o be
conscious is to have the experience of being cut off from that about
which one reflects: it is to be a subject that stands over against its
objects . . . The subjective awareness of separation. . . defines
consciousness."' The political philosopher Michael Sandel has recently argued that most (not all) modern political theory is committed to the proposition that "[w]hat separates us is in some important sense prior to what connects us-epistemologically prior as
well as morally prior. We are distinct individuals first, and then we
form relationships and engage in co-operative arrangements with
others; hence the priority of plurality over unity."4 The same commitment underlies virtually all of our legal theory. Indeed, Sandel's
formulation may be taken as a definitive restatement of the "separation thesis" that underlies modern jurisprudence.
The first purpose of this essay is to put forward the global and
critical claim that by virtue of their shared embrace of the separation thesis, all of our modern legal theory-by which I mean "liberal legalism" and "critical legal theory" collectively-is essentially
and irretrievably masculine. My use of "I" above was inauthentic,
just as the modern, increasing use of the female pronoun in liberal
and critical legal theory, although well-intended, is empirically and
experientially false. For the cluster of claims that jointly constitute
the "separation thesis"-the claim that human beings are, definitionally, distinct from one another, the claim that the referent of
"I" is singular and unambiguous, the claim that the word "individual" has an uncontested biological meaning, namely that we are
each physically individuated from every other, the claim that we
are individuals "first," and the claim that what separates us is
epistemologically and morally prior to what connects us-while
"trivially true" of men, are patently untrue of women. Women are
not essentially, necessarily, inevitably, invariably, always, and forever separate from other human beings: women, distinctively, are
quite clearly "connected" to another human life when pregnant. In
fact, women are in some sense "connected" to life and to other
2 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 33 (1974).

* Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Knowledge and Politics 200 (1975) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
4 Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 133 (1982).
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human beings during at least four recurrent and critical material
experiences: the experience of pregnancy itself; the invasive and
"connecting" experience of heterosexual penetration, which may
lead to pregnancy; the monthly experience of menstruation, which
represents the potential for pregnancy; and the post-pregnancy experience of breast-feeding. Indeed, perhaps the central insight of
feminist theory of the last decade has been that woman are "essentially connected," not "essentially separate," from the rest of
human life, both materially, through pregnancy, intercourse, and
breast-feeding, and existentially, through the moral and practical
life. If by "human beings" legal theorists mean women as well as
men, then the "separation thesis" is clearly false. If, alternatively,
by "human beings" they mean those for whom the separation thesis is true, then women are not human beings. It's not hard to
guess which is meant.
Parts One and Two of this Article will contrast the "human
being" constructed and described by (non-legal) feminist theory,
with the "human being" constructed, described, or simply assumed
by masculine jurisprudence. I will try to show that the "human
being" sometimes explicated, and most often simply assumed by
our modern legal theory contrasts in every particular with the "woman" sometimes assumed but more often carefully constructed by
modern feminist theory. That contrast, however, is not a simple
one. Neither masculine jurisprudence nor feminist theory is internally hegemonic. First, masculine jurisprudence is presently divided into two camps: "liberal legalism" on the one hand, and
"critical legal theory" on the other. While both liberal legal theorists and critical legal theorists subscribe to the "separation thesis"
described above, each group presents radically divergent accounts
of what I will call the "subjective experience" of the state of separation. Similarly, "feminist theory" is sharply divided between
"cultural feminism" on the one hand and "radical feminism" on
the other. And, in a parallel sense, while both cultural and radical
feminists subscribe to the "connection thesis" described above,
they present divergent accounts of the subjective experience of the
state of connection. Therefore, the first two parts of this article
will present what is ultimately a four-way contrast between the
complex and possibly conflicted human being constructed by masculine jurisprudence on the one hand, and the complex and possibly conflicted woman constructed by feminist theory on the other.
The third part of the Article discusses the possibility for, the
promise of, the obstacles to, and the present status of a truly feminist jurisprudence, which I define as a jurisprudence built upon
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feminist insights into women's true nature, rather than upon masculine insights into "human" nature. The gap between the description of human nature assumed or explicated by legal theory and
the description of women explicated by feminist theory reflects a
very real political obstacle to the development of a "feminist jurisprudence:" feminists take women's humanity seriously, and jurisprudence does not, because the law does not. Until that fact
changes, "feminist jurisprudence" is a political impossibility. The
virtual abolition of patriarchy-a political structure that values
men more than women-is the political precondition of a truly ungendered jurisprudence.But the gap between legal theory's descriptions of human nature and women's true nature also presents a
conceptual obstacle to the development of feminist jurisprudence:
jurisprudence must be about the relationship of human beings to
law, and feminist jurisprudence must be about women. Women,
though, are not human beings. Until that philosophical fact
changes, the phrase "feminist jurisprudence" is a conceptual
anomaly. Nevertheless, it does not follow that there is "no such
thing" as feminist jurisprudence, any more than it follows from the
dominant definition of a "human being" that there is no such thing
as women. The second purpose of this paper is to explore and improve upon the feminist jurisprudence we have generated to date,
in spite of patriarchy, and in spite of the masculinity of mainstream jurisprudence. Part two aims to schematize, review, and to
some extent redirect that jurisprudence.
Finally, the conclusion suggests how a humanist jurisprudence
might evolve, and how feminist legal theory can contribute to its
creation.
I. MASCULINE JURISPRUDENCE AND FEMINIST THEORY
The by now very well publicized split in masculine jurisprudence between legal liberalism and critical legal theory can be described in any number of ways. The now standard way to describe
the split is in terms of politics: "liberal legal theorists" align themselves with a liberal political philosophy which entails, among
other things, allegiance to the Rule of Law and to Rule of Law
virtues, while "critical legal theorists," typically left wing and radical, are skeptical of the Rule of Law and the split between law and
politics which the Rule of Law purportedly delineates. Critical legal theorists are potentially far more sensitive to the political underpinnings of purportedly neutral legalistic constructs than are
liberal legalists. I think this traditional characterization is wrong
for a number of reasons: liberal theorists are not necessarily politi-
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cally naive, and critical theorists are not necessarily radical. However, my purpose is not to critique it. Instead, I want to suggest
another way to understand the divisions in modern legal theory.
An alternative description of the difference (surely not the
only one) is that liberal legal theory and critical legal theory provide two radically divergent phenomenological descriptions of the
paradigmatically male experience of the inevitability of separation
of the self from the rest of the species, and indeed from the rest of
the natural world. Both schools, as we shall see, accept the separation thesis; they both view human beings as materially (or physically) separate from each other, and both view this fact as fundamental to the origin of law. But their accounts of the subjective
experience of physical separation from the other-an individual
other, the natural world, and society-are in nearly diametrical opposition. Liberal legalists, in short, describe an inner life enlivened
by freedom and autonomy from the separate other, and threatened
by the danger of annihilation by him. Critical legal theorists, by
contrast, tell a story of inner lives dominated by feelings of alienation and isolation from the separate other, and enlivened by the
possibility of association and community with him. These differing
accounts of the subjective experience of being separate from
others, I believe, are at the root of at least some of the divisions
between critical and liberal legal theorists. I want to review each of
these experiential descriptions of separation in some detail, for I
will ultimately argue that they are not as contradictory as they
first appear. Each story, I will suggest, constitutes a legitimate and
true part of the total subjective experience of masculinity.
I will start with the liberal description of separation, because
it is the most familiar, and surely the most dominant. According to
liberal legalism, the inevitability of the individual's material separation from the "other," entails, first and foremost, an existential
state of highly desirable and much valued freedom: because the
individual is separate from the other, he is free of the other. Because I am separate from you, my ends, my life, my path, my goals
are necessarily my own. Because I am separate, I am "autonomous." Because I am separate, I am existentially free (whether or
not I am politically free). And, of course, this is true not just of me,
but of everyone: it is the universal human condition. We are each
separate and we are all separate, so we are each free and we are all
free. We are, that is, equally free.
This existential condition of freedom in turn entails the liberal's conception of value. Because we are all free and we are each
equally free, we should be treated by our government as free, and
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as equally free. The individual must be treated by his government
(and by others) in a way that respects his equality and his freedom. The government must honor at the level of politics the existential claim made above: that my ends are my ends; that I cannot
be forced to embrace your ends as my own. Our separation entails
our freedom which in turn entails our right to establish and pursue
our own concept of value, independent of the concept of value pursued or favored by others. Ronald Dworkin puts the point in this
way:
What does it mean for the government to treat its citizens as
equals? That is . . . the same question as the question of
what it means for the government to treat all its citizens as
free, or as independent, or with equal dignity . . . . [To accord with this demand, a government must] be neutral on
what might be called the question of the good life ...
[P]olitical decisions must be, so far as is possible, independent
of any particular conception of the good life, or of what gives
value to life. Since the citizens of a society differ in their conceptions, the government does not treat them as equals if it
prefers one conception to another, either because the officials
believe that one is intrinsically superior, or because one is
held by the more numerous or more powerful group.'
Because of the dominance of liberalism in this culture, we
might think of autonomy as the "official" liberal value entailed by
the physical, material condition of inevitable separation from the
other: separation from the other entails my freedom from him, and
that in turn entails my political right to autonomy. I can form my
own conception of the good life, and pursue it. Indeed, any conception of the good which I form, will necessarily be my conception of
the good life. That freedom must be respected. Because I am free,
I value and have a right to autonomy. You must value it as well.
The state must protect it. This in turn implies other (more contested) values, the most important of which is (or may be) equality. Dworkin continues:
I now define a liberal as someone who holds ....
[a] liberal
...theory of what equality requires. Suppose that a liberal is
asked to found a new state. He is required to dictate its constitution and fundamental institutions. He must propose a

Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 191 (1985)(capitalization omitted)(emphasis
added).
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general theory of political distribution . . . He will arrive
initially at something like this principal of rough equality: resources and opportunities should be distributed, so far as possible, equally, so that roughly the same share of whatever is
available is devoted to satisfying the ambitions of each. Any
other general aim of distribution will assume either that the
fate of some people should be of greater concern than that of
others, or that the ambitions or talents of some are more worthy, and should be supported more generously on that
account.'
Autonomy, freedom and equality collectively constitute what
might be called the "up side" of the subjective experience of separation. Autonomy and freedom are both entailed by the separation
thesis, and autonomy and freedom both feel very good. However,
there's a "down side" to the subjective experience of separation as
well. Physical separation from the other entails not just my freedom; it also entails my vulnerability. Every other discrete, separate
individual-because he is the "other"-is a source of danger to me
and a threat to my autonomy. I have reason to fear you solely by
virtue of the fact that I am me and you are you. You are not me, so
by definition my ends are not your ends. Our ends might conflict.
You might try to frustrate my pursuit of my ends. In an extreme
case, you might even try to kill me-you might cause my
annihilation.
Annihilation by the other, we might say, is the official harm of
liberal theory, just as autonomy is its official value. Hobbes, of
course, gave the classic statement of the terrifying vulnerability
that stems from our separateness from the other:
Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and
mind; as that though there bee found one man sometimes
manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind then [sic] another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man
can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another
may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body,
the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either
by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are
in the same danger with himselfe ....
From this equality of
ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends.
And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which
Id. at 192-3 (capitalization omitted).
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neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies;
and in the way to their End, (which is principally their owne
conservation, . . .) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an
other. And from hence it comes to passe, that where an Invader hath no more to feare, than another mans single power;
if one plant, sow, build, or possesse a convenient Seat, others
may probably be expected to come prepared with forces
united, to dispossesse, and deprive him, not only of the fruit
of his labour, but also of his life, or liberty. And the Invader
again is in the like danger of another.'
Bruce Ackerman gives a more modern rendition, but the message
is essentially the same:
So long as we live, there can be no escape from the struggle
for power. Each of us must control his body and the world
around it. However modest these personal claims, they are
forever at risk in a world of scarce resources. Someone, somewhere, will-if given the chance-take the food that sustains
or the heart that beats within. Nor need such acts be attempted for frivolous reasons-perhaps my heart is the only
thing that will save a great woman's life, my food sufficient to
feed five starving men. No one can afford to remain passive
while competitors stake their claims. Nothing will be left to
reward such self-restraint. Only death can purchase immunity
from hostile claims to the power I seek to exercise.'
Thus, according to liberal legalism, the subjective experience
of physical separation from the other determines both what we
value (autonomy) and what we fear (annihilation). We value, and
seek societal protection, of our autonomy: the liberal insists on my
right to define and pursue my own life, my own path, my own
identity, and my own conception of the good life free of interference from others. Because I am me and you are you, I value what I
value, and you value what you value. The only value we truly
share, then, is our joint investment in autonomy from each other:
we both value our right to pursue our lives relatively free of
outside control. We can jointly insist that our government grant us
this protection. We also share the same fears. I fear the possibility-indeed the likelihood-that our ends will conflict, and you
will frustrate my ends and in an extreme case cause my annihila-

8

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 183-84 (C.B. Macpherson, ed. 1968).
Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 3 (1980) (emphasis added).
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tion, and you fear the same thing about me. I want the right and
the power to pursue my own chosen ends free of the fear that the
you will try to prevent me from doing so. You, of course, want the
same.
We can call this liberal legalist phenomenological narrative the
"official story" of the subjectivity of separation. According to the
official story, we value the freedom that our separateness entails,
while we seek to minimize the threat that it poses. We do so, of
course, through creating and then respecting the state. Whether or
not Robert Nozick is right that the minimal state achieves the liberal's ideal, he has nevertheless stated that liberal ideal well in the
following passage:
The minimal state treats us as inviolate individuals . .. ; it
treats us as persons having individual rights with the dignity
this constitutes. . . [This treatment] allows us, individually
or with whom we choose, to choose our life and to realize our
ends and our conception of ourselves, insofar as we can, aided
by the voluntary cooperation of other individuals possessing
the same dignity. How dare any state or group of individuals
do more. Or less. . . [T]here is no social entity with a good
that undergoes some sacrifice for its own good. There are only
individual people, different individual people, with their own
individual lives. Using one of these people for the benefit of
the others, uses him and benefits others. Nothing more.9
Now, Critical Legal Theory diverges from liberal legalism on
many points, but one striking contrast is this: critical theorists provide a starkly divergent phenomenological description of the subjective experience of separation. According to our critical legal theorists, the separate individual is indeed, in Sandel's phrase,
"epistemologically prior to the collective." Like liberal legalists,
critical legal theorists also view the individual as materially separate from the rest of human life. But according to the critical theorist, what that material state of separation existentially entails is
not a perpetual celebration of autonomy, but rather, a perpetual
longing for community, or attachment, or unification, or connection. The separate individual strives to connect with the "other"
from whom he is separate. The separate individual lives in a state
of perpetual dread not of annihilation by the other, but of the
alienation, loneliness, and existential isolation that his material

' Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia at 333-34, 32-33 (emphasis in original) (cited in
note 2).
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separation from the other imposes upon him. The individual
strives through love, work, and government to achieve a unification
with the other, the natural world, and the society from which he
was originally and continues to be existentially separated. The separate individual seeks community-not autonomy-and dreads
isolation and alienation from the other-not annihilation by him.
If we think of liberalism's depiction of the subjectivity of separation as the official story, then, we might think of this alternative
description of the subjectivity of separation as the unofficial story.
It is the subterranean, unofficial story of the unrecognized and-at
least by liberals-slightly detested subjective craving of lost
individuals.
Thus, there is a vast gap, according to critical theory, between
the "official value" of liberal legalism-autonomy-and what the
individual truly subjectively desires, which is to establish a true
connection with the other. Similarly, there is a vast gap between
the "official harm" of liberal legalism-annihilation by the
other-and what the individual truly subjectively dreads, which is
not annihilation by him, but isolation and alienation from him. According to the critical theorist, while the dominant liberal culture
insists we value autonomy and fear the other, what the individual
truly desires, craves, and longs to establish is some sort of connection with the other, and what the individual truly dreads is alienation from him. Robert Unger describes the terror that separation
inflicts upon the individual in this way:
Consciousness, then, is the sign of the self's distance from the
world. If one could imagine this separateness from nature in
its pure form, before it was counterbalanced by the effects of
human activity, its sign would be the experience of terror
before the strangeness of the world. Because this terror is the
mark of that very separation between self and nature upon
which consciousness itself is based, it has never been driven
completely out of conscious life. On the contrary, the strength
of the social bond, the willingness to accept almost every form
of degradation and enslavement at the hands of society, owes
much to the need men have of belonging to a social world in
which the foreignness of a pre-human nature does not
prevail.10
Indeed, the individual longs to reestablish connection with the
other in spite of the very real possibility (acknowledged by most if

'0Unger,

Knowledge and Politics at 201 (emphasis added)(cited in note 3).
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not all critical theorists) that that other might, at any moment,
frustrate his ends, threaten his autonomy, or annihilate him. But
this longing for community survives in the face of an even more
powerful source of resistance. The longing for attachment to the
other persists in spite of the dominant liberal culture's adamant
denial of the desire's existence. Peter Gabel describes the longing
for connection in this way:
Let me start by making a descriptive assertion that may be
controversial but which seems to me nonetheless self-evidently true-we are constituted as social beings by the desire
to be recognized by others in an empowering, life-giving way.
It is this fundamental experiential need that animates a
baby's search for "eye-contact" with mother as well as the organizational efforts of adults who try to form into groups to
vitalize their work-situations through the achievement of solidarity. While our actions are obviously also motivated by
other factors ... it is the desire to connect through this confirming or genuine reciprocity that gives to our actions their
distinctive social energy, impelling us out toward the other
even when . . . the likelihood of success seems very small.11
In another sense, though, the longing for connection persists
not so much "in spite of" the dominant culture's valuation of autonomy, but because of that value. The value we place on autonomy, according to some critical legal theorists, aggravates our
alienation, isolation and loneliness. Duncan Kennedy describes the
feeling:
The "freedom" of individualism is negative, alienated and arbitrary. It consists in the absence of restraint on the individual's choice of ends, and has no moral content whatever.
When the group creates an order consisting of spheres of autonomy separated by (property) and linked by (contract)
rules, each member declares her indifference to her neighbor's
salvation-washes her hands of him the better to "deal" with
him. The altruist asserts that the staccato alternation of
mechanical control and obliviousness is destructive of every
value that makes freedom a thing to be desired. We can
achieve real freedom only collectively, through group self-determination. We are simply too weak to realize ourselves in
n Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 Tex.L.Rev. 1563, 1566-7 (1984)(citation omitted).
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isolation . . . . The problem is the conversion of force into
moral force, in the fact of the experience of moral indeterminacy. A definition of freedom that ignores this problem is no
more than a rationalization of indifference, or the velvet glove
for the hand of domination through rules. 2
The longing for connection with the other, and the dread of
alienation from him, according to the critical theorists, is in a state
of constant "contradiction" with the official value and official harm
that flow from separation-autonomy from the other and annihilation by him. Nevertheless, in spite of that tension, both the dread
of alienation and the desire for connection are constantly there.
The dominant culture insists we value autonomy from the other
and fear annihilation by him. But subjectively, the individual lives
with a more or less unrealized desire to connect with the other, and
a constant dread or fear, of becoming permanently alienated, isolated-lost-from the other.
To summarize: according to liberal legalism, each of us is
physically separate from every other, and because of that separation, we value our autonomy from the other and fear our annihilation by him. I have called these our "officially" recognized values
and harms. Critical legal theory tells the unofficial story. According
to critical legal theory, we are indeed physically separate from the
other, but what that existentially entails is that we dread the alienation and isolation from the separate other, and long for connection with him. While liberal culture officially and publicly claims
that we love our autonomy and fear the other, subjective life belies
this claim. Subjectively, and in spite of the dominant culture's insistence to the contrary, we long to establish some sort of human
connection with the other in order to overcome the pain of isolation and alienation which our separateness engenders. These two
contrasting stories of the subjective experience of perpetual separation from the rest of human life might be schematized in this
way:

12Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv.L.Rev.
1685, 1774 (1976).
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(The Official Story)

(The Unofficial Story)

LIBERAL LEGALISM

CRITICAL LEGALISM

Autonomy

Longing):

HARM (or
Dread):

Connection;
Community

Annihilation;
Frustration

Alienation;
Isolation

Let me now turn to feminist theory. Although the legal academy is for the most part unaware of it, modern feminist theory is
as fundamentally divided as legal theory. One way to characterize
the conflict-the increasingly standard way to characterize the
conflict-is that while most modern feminists agree that women
are different from men and agree on the importance of the difference, feminists differ over which differences between men and
women are most vital. According to one group of feminists, sometimes called "cultural feminists," the important difference between
men and women is that women raise children and men don't. According to a second group of feminists, now called "radical feminists," the important difference between men and women is that
women get fucked and men fuck: "women," definitionally, are
"those from whom sex is taken," just as workers, definitionally, are
those from whom labor is taken. Another way to put the difference
is in political terms. Cultural feminists appear somewhat more
"moderate" when compared with the traditional culture: from a
mainstream non-feminist perspective, cultural feminists appear to
celebrate many of the same feminine traits that the traditional culture has stereotypically celebrated. Radical feminists, again from a
mainstream perspective, appear more separatist, and, in contrast
with standard political debate, more alarming. They also appear to
be more "political" in a sense which perfectly parallels the critical
theory-liberal theory split described above: radical feminists appear to be more attuned to power disparities between men and
women than are cultural feminists.
I think this traditional characterization is wrong on two
counts. First, cultural feminists no less than radical feminists are
well aware of women's powerlessness vis-a-vis men, and second,
radical feminism, as I will later argue, is as centrally concerned
with pregnancy as it is with intercourse. But again, instead of arguing against this traditional characterization of the divide between
radical and cultural feminism, I want to provide an alternative. My
alternative characterization structurally (although not substantively) parallels the characterization of the difference between lib-
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eral and critical legalism. Underlying both radical and cultural
feminism is a conception of women's existential state that is
grounded in women's potential for physical, material connection to
human life, just as underlying both liberal and critical legalism is a
conception of men's existential state that is grounded in the inevitability of men's physical separation from the species. I will call
the shared conception of women's existential lives the "connection
thesis." The divisions between radical and cultural feminism stem
from divergent accounts of the subjectivity of the potential for
connection, just as what divides liberal from critical legal theory
are divergent accounts of the subjectivity of the inevitability of
separation.
The "connection thesis" is simply this: Women are actually or
potentially materially connected to other human life. Men aren't.
This material fact has existential consequences. While it may be
true for men that the individual is "epistemologically and morally
prior to the collectivity," it is not true for women. The potential
for material connection with the other defines women's subjective,
phenomenological and existential state, just as surely as the inevitability of material separation from the other defines men's existential state. Our potential for material connection engenders
pleasures and pains, values and dangers, and attractions and fears,
which are entirely different from those which follow, for men, from
the necessity of separation. Indeed, it is the rediscovery of the multitude of implications from this material difference between men
and women which has enlivened (and divided) both cultural and
radical feminism in this decade (and it is those discoveries which
have distinguished both radical and cultural feminism from liberal
feminism). As Carol Gilligan notes, this development is somewhat
paradoxical: during the same decade that liberal feminist political
activists and lawyers pressed for equal (meaning same) treatment
by the law, feminist theorists in non-legal disciplines rediscovered
women's differences from men.13 Thus, what unifies radical and
cultural feminist theory (and what distinguishes both from liberal
feminism) is the discovery, or rediscovery, of the importance of
women's fundamental material difference from men. As we shall
see, neither radical feminists nor cultural feminists are entirely explicit in their embrace of the connection thesis. But both groups,
implicitly if not explicitly, adhere to some version of it.
If both cultural and radical feminists hold some version of the
13 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice 6-8 (1982).
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connection thesis, then one way of understanding the issues that
divide radical and cultural feminists, different from the standard
account given above, is that while radical and cultural feminists
agree that women's lives are distinctive in their potential for material connection to others, they provide sharply contrasting accounts of the subjective experience of the material and existential
state of connection. According to cultural feminist accounts of
women's subjectivity, women value intimacy, develop a capacity
for nurturance, and an ethic of care for the "other" with which we
are connected, just as we learn to dread and fear separation from
the other. Radical feminists tell a very different story. According to
radical feminism, women's connection with the "other" is above all
else invasive and intrusive: women's potential for material "connection" invites invasion into the physical integrity of our bodies,
and intrusion into the existential integrity of our lives. Although
women may "officially" value the intimacy of connection, we
"unofficially" dread the intrusion it inevitably entails, and long for
the individuation and independence that deliverance from that
state of connection would permit. Paralleling the structure above, I
will call these two descriptions feminism's official and unofficial
stories of women's subjective experience of physical connection.
In large part due to the phenomenal success of Carol Gilligan's
book In a Different Voice, cultural feminism may be the most familiar of these two feminist strands, and for that reason alone, I
call it feminism's "official story." "Cultural feminism" (in this
country and among academics) is in large part defined by Gilligan's book. Defined as such, cultural feminism begins not with a
commitment to the "material" version of the connection thesis (as
outlined above), but rather, with a commitment to its more observable existential and psychological consequences. Thus limited, we
can put the cultural feminist point this way: women have a "sense"
of existential "connection" to other human life which men do not.
That sense of connection in turn entails a way of learning, a path
of moral development, an aesthetic sense, and a view of the world
and of one's place within it which sharply contrasts with men's. To
reverse Sandel's formulation, for women, connection is "prior,"
both epistemologically and, therefore, morally, to the individual.
One cultural feminist-Suzanna Sherry-calls this women's view
of the world a "feminine" rather than "feminist" perspective. She
summarizes the "feminine perspective" in this way:
[T]he feminine perspective views individuals primarily as interconnected members of a community. Nancy Chodorow and
Carol Gilligan, in groundbreaking studies on the development
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of self and morality, have concluded that women tend to have
a more intersubjective sense of self than men and that the
feminine perspective is therefore more other-directed ....
The essential difference between the male and female perspectives [is that] . . . "the basic feminine sense of self is

connected to the world, the basic masculine sense of self is
separate." Women thus tend to see others as extensions of
themselves rather than as outsiders or competitors.4
Why are men and women different in this essential way? The
cultural feminist explanation for women's heightened sense of connection is that women are more "connected" to life than are men
because it is women who are the primary caretakers of young children. A female child develops her sense of identity as "continuous"
with her caretaker's, while a young boy develops a sense of identity
that is distinguished from his caretaker's. Because of the gender
alignment of mothers and female children, young girls "fuse" their
growing sense of identity with a sense of sameness with and attachment to the other, while because of the gender distinction between mothers and male children, young boys "fuse" their growing
sense of identity with a sense of difference and separation from the
other. This turns out to have truly extraordinary and far reaching
consequences, for both cognitive and moral development. Nancy
Chodorow explains:
[This means that] [g]irls emerge from this period with a basis
for "empathy" built into their primary definition of self in a
way that boys do not .

. .

. [G]irls come to experience them-

selves as less differentiated than boys, as more continuous
with and related to the external object-world and5 as differently oriented to their inner object-world as well.'
Women are therefore capable of a degree of physical as well as
psychic intimacy with the other which greatly exceeds men's capacity. Carol Gilligan finds that:
The fusion of identity and intimacy . . . [is] clearly articulated . . . in [women's] . . . self-descriptions. In response to
the request to describe themselves, . . . women describe a re-

lationship, depicting their identity in the connection of future
mother, present wife, adopted child, or past lover. Similarly,
Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication,
72 Va.L.Rev. 543, 584-85 (1986)(citations omitted)(emphasis added).
"I Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering 167 (1978).
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the standard of moral judgement that informs their assessment of self is a standard of relationship, an ethic of nurturance, responsibility, and care . . . [In] women's descrip-

tions, identity is defined in a context of relationship and
judged by a standard of responsibility and care. Similarly, morality is seen by these women as arising from the experience of
connection and conceived as a problem of inclusion rather
than one of balancing claims.' 6
One of Gilligan's subjects, Claire, eloquently expresses her subjective sense of epistemological, moral, and psychological connection:
By yourself, there is little sense to things. It is like the sound
of one hand clapping, the sound of one man or one woman,
there is something lacking. It is the collective that is important to me, and that collective is based on certain guiding
principles, one of which is that everybody belongs to it and
that you all come from it. You have to love someone else, because while you may not like them, you are inseparable from
them. In a way, it is like loving your right hand. They are
part of you; that other person is part of that giant collection
17
of people that you are connected to.

Thus, according to Gilligan (and her subjects), women view
themselves as fundamentally connected to, not separate from, the
rest of life. This difference permeates virtually every aspect of our
lives. According to the vast literature on difference now being developed by cultural feminists, women's cognitive development, literary sensibility, aesthetic taste, and psychological development,
no less than our anatomy, are all fundamentally different from
men's, and are different in the same way: unlike men, we view ourselves as connected to, not separate from, the other. As a consequence, women's ways of knowing are more "integrative" than
men's; women's aesthetic and critical sense is "embroidered"
rather than "laddered;" women's psychological development remains within the sphere of "attachment" rather than
"individuation."
The most significant aspect of our difference, though, is surely
the moral difference. According to cultural feminism, women are
more nurturant, caring, loving and responsible to others than are
men. This capacity for nurturance and care dictates the moral
" Gilligan, In a Different Voice at 159-60 (cited in note 13).
17

Id. at 160.
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terms in which women, distinctively, construct social relations:
women view the morality of actions against a standard of responsibility to others, rather than against a standard of rights and autonomy from others. As Gilligan puts it:
The moral imperative . . . [for] women is an injunction to
care, a responsibility to discern and alleviate the "real and
recognizable trouble" of this world. For men, the moral imperative appears rather as an injunction to respect the rights of
others and thus to protect from interference the rights to life
and self-fulfillment.18
Cultural feminists, to their credit, have reidentified these differences as women's strengths, rather than women's weaknesses.
Cultural feminism does not simply identify women's differences-patriarchy too insists on women's differences-it celebrates
them. Women's art, women's craft, women's narrative capacity,
women's critical eye, women's ways of knowing, and women's
heart, are all, for the cultural feminist, redefined as things to celebrate. Quilting, cultural feminism insists, is not just something
women do; it is art, and should be recognized as such. Integrative
knowledge is not a confused and failed attempt to come to grips
with the elementary rules of deductive logic; it is a way of knowledge and should be recognized as such. Women's distinctive aesthetic sense is as valid as men's. Most vital, however, for cultural
feminism is the claim that intimacy is not just something women
do, it is something human beings ought to do. Intimacy is a source
of value, not a private hobby. It is morality, not habit.
To pursue my structural analogy to masculine legal theory,
then, intimacy and the ethic of care constitute the entailed values
of the existential state of connection with others, just as autonomy
and freedom constitute the entailed values of the existential state
of separation from others for men. Because women are fundamentally connected to other human life, women value and enjoy intimacy with others (just as because men are fundamentally separate
from other human life men value and enjoy autonomy). Because
women are connected with the rest of human life, intimacy with
the "other" comes naturally. Caring, nurturance, and an ethic of
love and responsibility for life is second nature. Autonomy, or freedom from the other constitutes a value for men because it reflects
an existential state of being: separate. Intimacy is a value for
women because it reflects an existentially connected state of being.
Is Id. at 100.
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Intimacy, the capacity for nurturance and the ethic of care
constitute what we might call the "up side" of the subjective experience of connection. It's all good. Intimacy feels good, nurturance
is good, and caring for others morally is good. But there's a "down
side" to the subjective experience of connection. There's danger,
harm, and fear entailed by the state of connection as well as value.
Whereas men fear annihilation from the separate other (and consequently have trouble achieving intimacy), women fear separation
from the connected other (and consequently have trouble achieving independence). Gilligan makes the point succinctly: "Since
masculinity is defined through separation while femininity is defined through attachment, male gender identity is threatened by
intimacy while female gender identity is threatened by separation."1 9 Separation, then, might be regarded as the official harm of
cultural feminism. When a separate self must be asserted, women
have trouble asserting it. Women's separation from the other in
adult life, and the tension between that separation and our fundamental state of connection, is felt most acutely when a woman
must make choices, and when she must speak the truth. It is at
those times that separation and individuation are at a premium.
Gilligan explains:
Since women, however, define their identity through relationships of intimacy and care, the moral problems that they encounter pertain to issues of a different sort. When relationships are secured by masking desire and conflict is avoided
by equivocation, then confusion arises about the locus of responsibility and truth. [Mary] McCarthy, describing her 'representation' to her grandparents, explains:
Whatever I told them was usually so blurred and glossed,
in the effort to meet their approval. . . that except when
answering a direct question, I hardly knew whether what
I was saying was true or false. I really tried, or so I
thought, to avoid lying, but it seemed to me that they
forced it on me by the difference in their vision of things,
so that I was always transposing reality for them into
terms they could understand. To keep matters straight
with my conscience, I shrank, whenever possible from the
lie absolute, just as, from a sense of precaution, I shrank
from the plain truth.

19 Id. at 8.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[55:1

The critical experience then becomes not intimacy but choice,
creating an encounter with self that clarifies the understanding of responsibility and truth.20
Separation, and the fear of separation, can lead to real harm, especially in later life. In her final chapter, Gilligan elaborates:
[B]ecause women's sense of integrity appears to be entwined
with an ethic of care, so that to see themselves as women is to
see themselves in a relationship of connection, the major transitions in women's lives would seem to involve changes in the
understanding and activities of care. Certainly the shift from
childhood to adulthood witnesses a major redefinition of
care ...
In the same vein, however, the events of mid-life-the
menopause and changes in family and work-can alter a woman's activities of care in ways that affect her sense of herself.
If mid-life brings an end to relationships, to the sense of connection on which she relies, as well as to the activities of care
through which she judges her worth, then the mourning that
accompanies all life transitions can give way to the melancholia of self-deprecation and despair.2 1
Now, while Gilligan is undoubtedly explaining a real experiential phenomenon-I don't know of any woman who hasn't recognized herself somewhere in this book-her material explanation of
that phenomenon is incomplete. Which is not to say it isn't true: It
seems quite plausible that women are more psychically connected
to others in just the way Gilligan describes and for just the reason
she expounds. Mothers raise children, and as a consequence girls,
and not boys, think of themselves a' continuous with, rather than
separate from, that first all-important "other"-the mother. But
this psychological and developmental explanation just raises-it
does not answer-the background material question: why do
women, rather than men, raise, nurture, and cook for children?
What is the cause of this difference?
Although Gilligan doesn't address the issue, other cultural
feminists have, and their explanations converge, I believe, implicitly if not explicitly, on a material, or mixed material-cultural, and
not just a cultural answer: women raise children-and hence raise
girls who are more connected and nurturant, and therefore more
20
21

Id. at 164 (emphasis added).
Id. at 171.
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likely to be nurturant caretakers themselves-because it is women
who bear children. Women are not inclined to abandon an infant
they've carried for nine months and then delivered. If so, then
women are ultimately more "connected"-psychically, emotionally,
and morally-to other human beings because women, as children
were raised by women and women raise children because women,
uniquely, are physically and materially "connected" to those
human beings when the human beings are fetuses and then infants. Women are more empathic to the lives of others because
women are physically tied to the lives of others in a way which
men are not. Women's moral voice is one of responsibility, duty
and care for others because women's material circumstance is one
of responsibility, duty and care for those who are first physically
attached, then physically dependent, and then emotionally interdependent. Women think in terms of the needs of others rather
than the rights of others because women materially, and then
physically, and then psychically, provide for the needs of others.
Lastly, women fear separation from the other rather than annihilation by him, and "count" it as a harm, because women experience
the "separating" pain of childbirth and more deeply feel the pain
of the maturation and departure of adult children.
Although this material explanation of women's difference now
overtly dominates at least some forms of French cultural feminism,
it still plays a largely implicit, rather than explicit role in United
States cultural feminism, although that status is changing. There
are several reasons for the reluctance of American cultural feminists to explicitly embrace a material version of the connection
thesis. The first is totally external to feminism, and is, rather, internal to the academic community for which Gilligan's book was
written and in which it was received. It is an academic allegiance
to empirical rather than phenomenological explanations of social
phenomena. Material explanations require a willingness to engage
in a form of speculative inquiry which is contrary to now dominant
academic modes of proof.
The second, and I believe major, reason for the resistance to
material explanations of women's difference in American feminism
is primarily strategic: American feminists of all stripes are wary of
identifying the material fact of pregnancy as the root of moral, aesthetic, and cognitive difference, because, as liberal feminist and
law professor Wendy Williams correctly notes, "most of the disadvantages imposed on women, in the workforce and elsewhere, derive from this central reality of the capacity of women to become
pregnant and the real and supposed implications of this real-
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ity."2 2 The response to this "central reality" among American liberal feminists and American feminist lawyers has been to deny or
minimize the importance of the pregnancy difference, thus making
men and women more "alike," so as to force the legal system to
treat men and women similarly.
Although a review of the history of liberal feminism is well
beyond the scope of this essay, suffice it to say that there is a growing awareness amongst even liberal feminist legal theorists that
this strategy has to some extent backfired. It has become increasingly clear that feminists must attack the burdens of pregnancy
and its attendant differences, rather than denying the uniqueness
of pregnancy. Thus, in a liberal feminist essay which for the most
part rigorously attacks the pregnancy difference as "stereotyped"
and false, Lucinda Finley in one paragraph acknowledges, and
even commits herself to, a radically different point of view:
Permeating and sustaining each of these assumptions is the
view that pregnancy is unique-that it affects only women
and it is like no other human condition in its immediate physical effects, significance, and consequences. This fundamental
assumption of uniqueness cannot easily be disputed, and it
is not likely soon to wither away. Many women and men of a
wide variety of political outlooks wish not to dispute pregnancy's uniqueness, but to celebrate it ....
I sense that we
will have lost something very fundamentally human in...
a
world of no "real" differences. My sense of loss stems from a
feeling that I as a woman want to be able to revel in the joy
and virtually mystical specialness of having a baby. What I do
not want is to be punished for this wonderful gift at the same
time. My feeling that something will be missing in this ideal
androgynous world also comes from a fear that it rests on a
vision of equality that says we can all be equal if we just strip
away all our differences. Life in such a world would be boring,
impoverished and unenriching ....
The problem is not the
uniqueness of something like pregnancy, but the view that
our legal system has adopted towards "special"human qualities, particularly qualities that are special because they are
inherently female in the sense that they cannot be experienced by a male.2 3
22 Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy, 1977, Hearings on S. 995 Before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
123 (1977)(remarks of Professor Wendy Williams)(emphasis added).
22 Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and
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Outside of the legal community, however, there is less reluctance among even U.S. cultural feminists to embrace material explanations both of women's moral distinctiveness and political oppression. Let me mention just three examples, each from different
disciplines. First, poet and scholar Adrienne Rich, who has surely
done more than any other American feminist to lay bare the issues
surrounding mandatory motherhood within conditions of patriarchy, briefly suggests the centrality of motherhood and the physicality of pregnancy to women's lives, to women's existential sense
of connection, and ultimately of course to feminism:
I have seen massive sculpturelike weavings, of jute, hemp, and
wool, in which many varicolored strands are quickly visible
like vines or striations; but when you come closer and try to
touch this or that strand, your hand enters a dense, bristling
mesh, thick with knotted and twisted filaments, some harsh
and rough to the fingers, others surprisingly silky and strong.
In ... thinking about motherhood. . . , I have felt a similar
sensation, of elemental exploration and of complex discovery
....
For motherhood is the great mesh in which all human
relations are entangled, in which lurk our most elemental assumptions about love and power.
If we speak of motherhood at all, we are inevitably speaking of something far more than the relationship of a woman
with her children. And even this relationship has been shaped
long before the first child's birth. All women are daughters of
women-is this an obvious, a simple-minded statement? or
does it reach through the layers of the weaving to inner
chambers only now beginning to be explored by women? It
has been suggested by Margaret Mead that possibly a deep
chemical affinity exists, of which we as yet know nothing, between the body of the mother and her still unborn female
child. It has been affirmed by Nancy Chodorow, that through
the intense mother-daughter relationship women come into a
deep and richer inner life than men, and, even when heterosexual, tend to be more deeply attached to women than to
men, and more capable than men of relationship ....
[F]eminist artists, historians, anthropologists have been
the first to show concern and respect for the crafts of the midwives and grandmothers, the anonymous work of women's

the Workplace Debate, 86 Colum.L.Rev. 1118, 1139-40 (1986)(citations omitted)(emphasis
added).
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hands, the oral culture of women sitting in the kitchens, the
traditional arts and remedies passed on from mother to
daughter, the female culture never granted the reverence accorded to "high art.".

.

. And so we can both take pride in all

that women have done for "love"-including the resourceful,
heroic coping of ordinary women everywhere-and also ask
"Why should women, and women only, work for love only?"2
Marilyn French has also begun to bring an overtly material
explanation both of women's "difference" and of women's oppression out of the background and into the forefront of American cultural feminism. Women have a different moral voice, French argues, because women are fundamentally committed to the
preservation and survival of life, while men are committed to the
goal of transcendence. Although French insists, correctly, that this
existential difference is in no sense biologically mandated (men
could become more nurturant and women could become more independent), it is nevertheless biologically grounded: it reflects natural and material facts, and reflects our natural and pre-legal history. Women are tied to nature and the life of the other, French
argues, while men are fearful of nature and seek to transcend it
rather than preserve it. It is this material reality which entails
women's existential connection:
Women and men-in general-have different moralities because they have different goals. Male morals are designed to
permit male transcendence. Life-that mass of breathing
flesh, sweating pores, darting sensation, uncontrollable being-is rooted in nature, in the fetid swamp, the foul murk
into which manufactured nature-cities-seems always about
to sink. Above these, stark, pure, beyond the pull of heart or
genitals, soar a rigid set of principles, rules, taboos. To prove
his full manhood

. . .

a man must cleave to these and aban-

don the other, which is the realm of woman ....
Female morals are designed to permit survival. Life is the
highest good . : not necessarily one's personal life, but life
itself, of plants and animals and humans, the community, the
tribe, the family, the children . ...

Female morals foster survival: which means they foster
those elements, both material and immaterial, that are necessary to life. Women grow much of the world's food, and every24 Adrienne

Rich, On Lies, Secrets,

ted)(emphasis added).

and Silence 260-63

(1979)(citation

omit-
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where women prepare food for those they live with. They do
this because they are expected to, because they expect to, because they want to . . . It is rewarded by the well-being of
those fed. This is true.2 5

French ties this difference to pre-legal and pre-patriarchal history:
The fact that women from the first took responsibility for the
young, feeding and teaching and protecting them, probably
led by analogy to their taking responsibility for feeding the
entire group. Female animals take responsibility for creating
and finding shelter, making nests, for their young and themselves; early women continued this activity, building shelters
both temporary and permanent. In many societies women still
perform this task. The first feeding of the young from
women's bodies may have led by analogy to responsibilityfor
other forms of feeding-to grinding and cooking the vegetables they had gathered. Male responsibility was far more limited: among many groups even today, men care for themselves-they gather for themselves, make tools for
themselves-and contribute minimally to the needs of the
26
community.
French also ties women's reproductive function to the cause of
male contempt for women and ultimately to patriarchy itself; indeed, that men's dread of, fear of, and contempt for women's lifegiving reproductive power is the root cause of patriarchy is perhaps
the central thesis of Beyond Power. In the final chapter, however,
French suggests an implication of women's reproductive difference
that goes beyond the causal explanation of patriarchy, and effects
a subtle but important variation on Gilligan's thesis. The experience of being cared for as an infant, French suggests, is the root of
the ethic of care celebrated by cultural feminists. Women, of
course, do the caring, both before birth and immediately after it,
but we have all had the experience of being cared for. We have all,
that is, women as well as men, had the experience of "connection."
That experience of being cared for is the cause of the different
voice-presently, but by no means inevitably, women's voice-this
time identified as a "feminist vision" rather than a "feminine
perspective":
Feminism does not offer a fixed program or dogma, a new Law

" Marilyn

French, Beyond Power 482-83 (1985).

26 Id. at 40-41(first emphasis added)(second emphasis in original).
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for the future, but it does offer a new vision of human nature,
reality, and sociopolitical arrangement.
The vision entertained by many feminists, and the vision
that informs this book, is of a humanity whose first experience-even before birth as well as immediately after it-is of
being shared with, nurtured, cared for. We can, in a kind of
shorthand, call this experience love, and for some infants the
experience may be one of absolute love. For many it is a sharing and devotion mixed with resentment and hostility; nevertheless, the sharing is more important, for those who are not
given to do not survive. Thus, those of us who do survive were
shared with and nurtured sufficiently.
This early experience of being fed, held, warmed, protected, is one of ecstasy;

. . .

we seek out such experiences in

our later life. In addition, experiencing nurturing teaches us
all, men as well as women, how to nurture others in turn
....

A morality.., that is based on human experience and

need, rather than on the denial of human experience and
need, would reflect this order. Nurturing qualities would be
central, primary; education in limitation would be secondary
27
in time and importance.

Similarly, and finally, in Caring: A Feminine Approach to
Ethics and Moral Education,8 Stanford philosopher and cultural
feminist Nel Noddings endorses a biological and material explanation of women's different moral voice:
[C]learly, mothering and caring are deeply related. Several
contemporary writers have raised a question that seems odd
at first glance: Why is it that women in our society do the
mothering? . . . . The biological view holds that women, having given birth and entered lactation, are naturally nurturant
toward their infants. The socialization view denies arguments
for nature, instinct, and natural nurturance and insists that
mothering is a role-something learned. Finally, the psychological view suggested by Nancy Chodorow holds that the tendency for girls to want to mother, and to actually engage in
mothering, is the result of deep psychological processes established in close and special relationships with their own
mothers.
The socialization view, as an explanatory theory, seems
21 Id. at 536 (citation omitted).
28 Nel Noddings, Caring (1984).
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nonsense. We are not nearly so successful at socializing people
into roles as we are at reproducing mothering in women.
Mothering is not a role but a relationship. The psychological
view, however, seems very strong.. . . One difficulty [with it]
is that those endorsing psychological views have felt the need
to set aside or minimize biological arguments. It is true that a
woman's natural inclination to mother a newborn does not explain why she continues to mother a child into adolescence or
why she mothers other people's half-grown children. But it
may well be that a completely adequate theory will have to
embrace both biological and psychological factors.2"

Whether we embrace a material or a purely developmental explanation of women's heightened connection with the other, however, the "story" of women's relationship with the other as told by
cultural feminists contrast in virtually every particular with the
story of men's relationship to the other as told by liberals. First,
men, according to the Hobbesian account, are by nature equal.
"Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and
mind; as that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body. . .; yet when all is reckoned together, the
difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that
one man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit. . . . [T]he
weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest. . . ."30 Women,
by contrast, are not "equal" in strength to the most important
"other" they encounter: the fetus and then the newborn child.
Rather, the fetus and the woman and later the infant and the
mother occupy what might be called a natural, hierarchical web of
inequality, not a natural state of equality: whereas men may be
"by nature equal" women are "by nature stronger" than those who
are most important to them and most dependent upon them. The
natural physical equality between self and other on which Hobbes
insists is simply untrue of women's natural state. Second, according to Hobbes, "men" are naturally inclined to aggress against
those they perceive as the vulnerable other. Again, women are not:
infants are dependent upon mothers and vulnerable to them, yet
the natural mother does not aggress against her child, she breastfeeds her. And lastly, men respond to the vulnerability of natural
equality by developing a morality and a civil state that demand
respect for the equality, rights and freedom of the other. Women
Id. at 128.
1oHobbes, Leviathan at 183 (cited in note 7).
29
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do not. Women respond to their natural state of inequality by developing a morality of nurturance that is responsible for the wellbeing of the dependent, and an ethic of care that responds to the
greater needs of the weak. Men respond to the natural state of
equality with an ethic of autonomy and rights. Women respond to
the natural state of inequality with an ethic of responsibility and
care.
We might summarize cultural feminism in this way: women's
potential for a material connection to life entails (either directly,
as I have argued, or indirectly, through the reproduction of mothering) an experiential and psychological sense of connection with
other human life, which in turn entails both women's concept of
value, and women's concept of harm. Women's concept of value
revolves not around the axis of autonomy, individuality, justice
and rights, as does men's, but instead around the axis of intimacy,
nurturance, community, responsibility and care. For women, the
creation of value, and the living of a good life, therefore depend
upon relational, contextual, nurturant and affective responses to
the needs of those who are dependent and weak, while for men the
creation of value, and the living of the good life, depend upon the
ability to respect the rights of independent co-equals, and the deductive, cognitive ability to infer from those rights rules for safe
living. Women's concept of harm revolves not around a fear of annihilation by the other but around a fear of separation and isolation from the human community on which she depends, and which
is dependent upon her. If, as I have suggested, cultural feminism is
our dominant feminist dogma, then this account of the nature of
women's lives constitutes the "official text" of feminism, just as
liberal legalism constitutes the official text of legalism.
These two "official stories" sharply contrast. Whereas according to liberal legalism, men value autonomy from the other and
fear annihilation by him, women, according to cultural feminism,
value intimacy with the other and fear separation from her.
Women's sense of connection with others determines our special
competencies and special vulnerabilities, just as men's sense of
separation from others determines theirs. Women value and have a
special competency for intimacy, nurturance, and relational thinking, and a special vulnerability to and fear of isolation, separation
from the other, and abandonment, just as men value and have a
special competency for autonomy, and a special vulnerability to
and fear of annihilation.
Against the cultural feminist backdrop, the story that radical
feminists tell of women's invaded, violated lives is "subterranean"
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in the same sense that, against the backdrop of liberal legalism, the
story critical legal theorists tell of men's alienation and isolation
from others is subterranean. According to radical feminism,
women's connection to others is the source of women's misery, not
a source of value worth celebrating. For cultural feminists,
women's connectedness to the other (whether material or cultural)
is the source, the heart, the root, and the cause of women's different morality, different voice, different "ways of knowing," different
genius, different capacity for care, and different ability to nurture. For radical feminists, that same potential for connection-experienced materially in intercourse and pregnancy, but experienced existentially in all spheres of life-is the source of
women's debasement, powerlessness, subjugation, and misery. It is
the cause of our pain, and the reason for our stunted lives. Invasion and intrusion, rather than intimacy, nurturance and care,
is the "unofficial" story of women's subjective experience of
connection.
Thus, modern radical feminism is unified among other things
by its insistence on the invasive, oppressive, destructive implications of women's material and existential connection to the other.
So defined, radical feminism (of modern times) begins not with the
eighties critique of heterosexuality, but rather in the late sixties,
with Shulamith Firestone's angry and eloquent denunciation of the
oppressive consequences for women of the physical condition of
pregnancy. Firestone's assessment of the importance and distinctiveness of women's reproductive role parallels Marilyn French's.
Both view women's physical connection with nature and with the
other as in some sense the "cause" of patriarchy. But their analyses of the chain of causation sharply contrast. For French, women's
reproductive role-the paradigmatic experience of physical connection to nature, to life and to the other, and thus the core of
women's moral difference-is also the cause of patriarchy, primarfly because of men's fear of and contempt for nature. Firestone has
a radically different view. Pregnancy is indeed the paradigmatic
experience of physical connection, and it is indeed the core of
women's difference, but according to Firestone, it is for that reason
alone the cause of women's oppression. Male contempt has nothing
(at first) to do with it. Pregnancy itself, independent of male contempt, is invasive, dangerous and oppressive; it is an assault on the
physical integrity and privacy of the body. For Firestone, the strategic implication of this is both clear and clearly material. The
technological separation of reproduction from the female body is
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the necessary condition for women's liberation."
In a moment, I will turn to heterosexual intercourse, for it is
intercourse, rather than pregnancy, which consumes the attention
of the modern radical feminism of our decade. But before doing so
it's worth recognizing that the original radical feminist case for reproductive freedom did not turn on rights of "privacy" (either of
the doctor-patient relationship, or of the marriage, or of the famfly), or rights to "equal protection," or rights to be free of "discrimination." It did not turn on rights at all. Rather, the original
feminist argument for reproductive freedom turned on the definitive radical feminist insight that pregnancy-the invasion of the
body by the other to which women are distinctively vulnerable-is
an injury and ought to be treated as such. Pregnancy connects us
with life, as the cultural feminist insists, but that connection is not
something to celebrate; it is that very connection that hurts us.
This argument, as I will argue later, is radically incommensurate
with liberal legal ideology. There's no legal category that fits it.
But it is nevertheless the radical argument-that pregnancy is a
dangerous, psychically consuming, existentially intrusive, and
physically invasive assault upon the body which in turn leads to a
dangerous, consuming, intrusive, invasive assault on the mother's
self-identity-that best captures women's own sense of the injury
and danger of pregnancy, whether or not it captures the law's
sense of what an unwanted pregnancy involves, or why women
should have the right to terminate it.
The radical feminist argument for reproductive freedom appears in legal argument only inadvertently or surreptitiously, but it
does on occasion appear. It appeared most recently in the phenomenological descriptions of unwanted pregnancies collated in the
Thornburgh amicus brief recently filed by the National Abortion
Rights Action League ("NARAL").32 The descriptions of pregnancy collated in that peculiarly non-legal legal document are filled with metaphors of invasion-metaphors, of course, because we
lack the vocabulary to name these harms precisely. Those descriptions contrast sharply with the "joy" that cultural feminists celebrate in pregnancy, childbirth and child-raising. The invasion of
the self by the other emerges as a source of oppression, not a
Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex (1970).
Amicus Brief for the National Abortion Rights Action League, et. al., Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Nos. 84-495 and 84-1379 ("NARAL
Amicus Brief")(on file at The University of Chicago Law Review). For the Supreme Court
opinion, see 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
31

32
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source of moral value.
"During my pregnancy," one women explains, "I was treated
like a baby machine-an incubator without feelings."33 "Then I
got pregnant again," another woman writes,
This one would be only 13 months younger than the third
child. I was faced with the unpleasant fact that I could not
stop the babies from coming no matter what I did. .

. You

cannot possibly know what it is like to be the helpless pawn
34
of nature. I am a 71 year old widow.
"Almost exactly a decade ago," writes another, "I learned I
was pregnant .... I was sick in my heart and I thought I would
kill myself. It was as if I had been told my body had been invaded
with cancer. It seemed that very wrong.

'3 5

One woman speaks directly, without metaphor: "On the ride
home from the clinic, the relief was enormous. I felt happy for the
first time in weeks. I had a future again. I had my body back.""8
According to these women's self-descriptions, when the unwanted baby arrives, the injury is again one of invasion, intrusion
and limitation. The harm of an unwanted pregnancy is that the
baby will elicit a surrender (not an end) of the mother's life. The
fear of unwanted pregnancy is that one will lose control of one's
individuated being (not that one will die). Thus, one woman
writes, "I was like any other woman who had an unintended pregnancy, I was terrified and felt as though my life was out of my
control.

'37

This danger, and the fear of it, is gender-specific. It is a fear
which grips women, distinctively, and it is a fear about which men,
apparently, know practically nothing. Another woman writes:
I was furiously angry, dismayed, dismal, by turns. I could not
justify an abortion on economic grounds, on grounds of insufficient competence or on any other of a multitude of what
might be perceived as "legitimate" reasons. But I kept being
struck by the ultimate unfairness of it all. I could not conceive
of any event which would so profoundly impact upon any
man. Surely my husband would experience some additional financial burden, and additional "fatherly" chores, but his
NARAL Amicus Brief at 13 (emphasis added).
Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
Id .at 28 (emphasis added).
36 Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
3* Id. at 29.
"
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whole future plan was not hostage to this unchosen, undesired
event. Basically his life would remain the same progression of
ordered events as before."
And another:
Being a mother is hard at any age but being a teenager makes
it harder .. . Things I may have wanted to do before getting
pregnant, like college and a career are different now. Before I
think about my dreams, I have to think about taking care of a
baby .... I could be making plans for my future, but instead
I'm making plans for my baby's future. 9
Conversely, women who had abortions felt able to form their
own destiny. One woman wrote: "Personally legal abortion allowed
me the choice as a teenager living on a very poor Indian Reservation to finish growing up and make something of my life."' 40 And
another:
I was not glad that I was faced with an unwanted, unplanned
pregnancy, however I am glad that I made the decision to
have an abortion. The experience was a very positive one for
me. It helped me learn that I am a person and I can make
independent decisions. Had I not had the abortion I would
have probably ended up a single mother struggling for survival and dealing with a child that I was not ready for.41
As noted above, radical feminism of the eighties has focused
more on intercourse than on pregnancy. But this may represent
less of a divergence than it first appears. From the point of view of
the "connection thesis," what the radical feminists of the eighties
find objectionable, invasive, and oppressive about heterosexual intercourse, is precisely what the radical feminists of the sixties
found objectionable, invasive, and oppresisive about pregnancy and
motherhood. According to the eighties radical critique, intercourse,
like pregnancy, blurs the physical boundary between self and
other, and that blurring of boundaries between self and other constitutes a profound invasion of the self's physical integrity. That
invasion-the "dissolving of boundaries"--is something to condemn, not celebrate. Andrea Dworkin explains:
Sexual intercourse is not intrinsically banal, though pop-cul-8Id. at 29.
39 Id. at 24.
40

Id. at 29.

42

Id.
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ture magazines like Esquire and Cosmopolitan would suggest
that it is. It is intense, often desperate. The internal landscape
is violent upheaval, a wild and ultimately cruel disregard of
human individuality, . . . no respecter of boundaries ....
Sometimes, the skin comes off in sex. The people merge,
skinless. The body loses its boundaries.. . . There is no physical distance, no self-consciousness, nothing withdrawn or private or alienated, no existence outside physical touch. The
skin collapses as a boundary-it has no meaning . . . . Instead, there is necessity, nothing else-being driven, physical
immersion in "each other" but with no experience of "each
other" as separate entities coming together ...
The skin is a line of demarcation, a periphery, the fence,
the form, the shape, the first clue to identity in a society
• . . .and, in purely physical terms, the formal precondition
for being human. It is a thin veil of matter separating the
outside from the inside.. .. The skin is separation, individuality, the basis for corporeal privacy, .... .42

Women, distinctively, lose this "formal precondition for being
human" and they lose it in intercourse:
A human being has a body that is inviolate; and when it
is violated, it is abused. A woman has a body that is penetrated in intercourse: permeable, its corporeal solidness a lie.
The discourse of male truth-literature, science, philosophy,
pornography-calls that penetration violation. This it does
with some consistency and some confidence. Violation is a
synonym for intercourse. At the same time, the penetration is
taken to be a use, not an abuse; a normal use; it is appropriate
to enter her, to push into ("violate") the boundaries of her
body. She is human, of course, but by a standard that does
not include physical privacy. She is, in fact, human by a standard that precludes physical privacy, since to keep a man out
altogether and for a lifetime is deviant in the extreme, a psychopathology, a repudiation of the way in which she is expected to manifest her humanity."
Like pregnancy, then, intercourse is invasive, intrusive and violative, and like pregnancy it is therefore the cause of women's oppressed, invaded, intruded, violated, and debased lives. Dworkin
42
43

Andrea Dworkin, Intercourse 21-22 (1987)(emphasis added).
Id. at 122.
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concludes:
This is nihilism; or this is truth. He has to push in past
boundaries. There is the outline of a body, distinct, separate,
its integrity an illusion, a tragic deception,, because unseen
there is a slit between the legs, and he has to push into it.
There is never a real privacy of the body that can co-exist
with intercourse: with being entered. The vagina itself is muscled and the muscles have to be pushed apart. The thrusting
is persistent invasion. She is opened up, split down the center.
She is occupied-physically, internally, in her privacy ....
She, a human being, is supposed to have a privacy that is
absolute; except that she, a woman, has a hole between her
legs that men can, must, do enter. This hole, her hole, is synonymous with entry. A man has an anus that can be entered,
but his anus is not synonymous with entry. A woman has an
anus that can be entered, but her anus is not synonymous
with entry. The slit between her legs, so simple, so hidden-frankly, so innocent-for instance, to the child who
looks with a mirror to see if it could be true-is there an entrance to her body down there? . . .- that slit which means
entry into her-intercourse-appears to be the key to
women's lower human status. By definition, . . . she is intended to have a lesser privacy, a lesser integrity of the body,
a lesser sense of self, . . . [and] this lesser privacy, this lesser
integrity, this lesser self, establishes her lesser significance.
* * * She is defined by how she is made, that hole, which is
synonymous with entry; and intercourse,the act fundamental
to existence, has consequences to her being that may be intrinsic, not socially imposed."
Although Dworkin herself does not draw the parallel, for both
Dworkin and Firestone, women's potential for material connection
with the other-whether
through intercourse
or pregnancy-constitutes an invasion upon our physical bodies, an intrusion upon our lives, and consequently an assault upon our existential freedom, whether or not it is also the root of our moral
distinctiveness (the claim cultural feminism makes on behalf of
pregnancy), or the hope of our liberation (the claim sexual liberationists make on behalf of sex). Both intercourse and pregnancy
are literal, physical, material invasions and occupations of the
'" Id. at 122-23 (emphasis added on the words "and intercourse, the act," otherwise
emphasis in original).

1988]

Jurisprudenceand Gender

body. The fetus, like the penis, literally occupies my body. In their
extremes, of course, both unwanted heterosexual intercourse and
unwanted pregnancy can be life threatening experiences of physical invasion. An unwanted fetus, no less than an unwanted penis,
invades my body, violates my physical boundaries, occupies my
body and can potentially destroy my sense of self. Although the
culture does not recognize them as such, the physical and existential invasions occasioned by unwanted pregnancy and intercourse
are real harms. They are events we should fear. They are events
which any sane person should protect herself against. What unifies
the radical feminism of the sixties and eighties is the argument
that women's potential for material, physical connection with the
other constitutes an invasion which is a very real harm causing
very real damage, and which society ought to recognize as such.
The material, sporadic violation of a woman's body occasioned
by pregnancy and intercourse implies an existential and pervasive
violation of her privacy, integrity and life projects. According to
radical feminists, women's longings for individuation, physical privacy, and independence go well beyond the desire to avoid the
dangers of rape or unwanted pregnancy. Women also long for liberation from the oppression of intimacy (and its attendant values)
which both cultural feminism and most women officially, and
wrongly, overvalue. Intimacy, in short, is intrusive, even when it
isn't life threatening (perhaps especially when it isn't life threatening). An unwanted pregnancy is disastrous, but even a wanted
pregnancy and motherhood are intrusive. The child intrudes, just
as the fetus invades.
Similarly, while unwanted heterosexual intercourse is disastrous, even wanted heterosexual intercourse is intrusive. The penis
occupies the body and "divides the woman" internally, to use Andrea Dworkin's language, in consensual intercourse no less than in
rape. It preempts, challenges, negates, and renders impossible the
maintenance of physical integrity and the formation of a unified
self. The deepest unofficial story of radical feminism may be that
intimacy-the official value of cultural feminism-is itself oppressive. Women secretly, unofficially, and surreptitiously long for the
very individuation that cultural feminism insists women fear: the
freedom, the independence, the individuality, the sense of wholeness, the confidence, the self-esteem, and the security of identity
which can only come from a life, a history, a path, a voice, a sexuality, a womb, and a body of one's own. Dworkin explains:
In the experience of intercourse, she loses the capacity for integrity because her body-the basis of privacy and freedom in
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the material world for all human beings-is entered and occupied; the boundaries of her physical body are-neutrally
speaking-violated. What is taken from her in that act is not
recoverable, and she spends her life-wanting, after all to
have something-pretending that pleasure is in being reduced
through intercourse to insignificance .

. .

. She learns to er-

oticize powerlessness and self-annihilation. The very boundaries of her own body become meaningless to her, and even
worse, useless to her. The transgression of those boundaries
comes to signify a sexually charged degradation into which
she throws herself, having been told, convinced, that identity,
for a female, is there-somewhere beyond privacy and self15
respect.

Radical feminism, then, is unified by a particular description
of the subjectivity of the material state of connection. According to
that description, women dread intrusion and invasion, and long for
an independent, individualized, separate identity. While women
may indeed "officially" value intimacy, what women unofficially
crave is physical privacy, physical integrity, and sexual celibacy-in a word, physical exclusivity. In the moral realm, women
officially value contextual, relational, caring, moral thinking, but
secretly wish that everyone would get the hell out of our lives so
that we could pursue our own projects-we loathe the intrusion
that intimacy entails. In the epistemological and moral realms,
while women officially value community, the web, the spinning
wheel, and the weave, we privately crave solitude, self-regard, selfesteem, linear thinking, legal rights, and principled thought.
The contrasting accounts of women's subjective lives that
emerge from modern feminist theory's rediscovery of women's difference might be schematized in this way:
CULTURAL FEMINISM
VALUE, (or

Intimacy

Longing):

HARM, (or
Dread):

RADICAL FEMINISM
Individuation
Integrity

Separation

Invasion;
Intrusion

Finally, then, we can schematize the contrast between the
description of the "human being" that emerges from modern legal
45

Id. at 137-38.
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theory, and the description of women that emerges from modern
feminism:
THE OFFICIAL STORY
(Liberal legalism and
cultural feminism)

THE UNOFFICIAL STORY
(Critical legalism
and radical feminism)

Value

Harm

Longing

Dread

LEGAL THEORY
(human beings)

Autonomy

Annihilation;
Frustration

Attachment;
Connection

Alienation

FEMINIST THEORY
(women)

Intimacy

Separation

Individuation

Invasion;
Intrusion

As the diagram reveals, the descriptions of the subjectivity of
human existence told by feminist theory and legal theory contrast
at every point. There is no overlap. First, and most obviously, the
"official" descriptions of human beings' subjectivity and women's
subjectivity contrast rather than compare. According to liberal theory, human beings respond aggressively to their natural state of
relative physical equality. In response to the great dangers posed
by their natural aggression, they abide by a sharply anti-naturalist
morality of autonomy, rights, and individual spheres of freedom,
which is intended to and to some extent does curb their natural
aggression. They respect a civil state that enforces those rights
against the most egregious breaches. The description of women's
subjectivity told by cultural feminism is much the opposite. According to cultural feminism, women inhabit a realm of natural inequality. They are physically stronger than the fetus and the infant. Women respond to their natural inequality over the fetus and
infant not with aggression, but with nurturance and care. That
natural and nurturant response evolves into a naturalist moral
ethic of care which is consistent with women's natural response.
The substantive moralities consequent to these two stories, then,
unsurprisingly, are also diametrically opposed. The autonomy that
human beings value and the rights they need as a restriction on
their natural hostility to the equal and separate other are in sharp
contrast to the intimacy that women value, and the ethic of care
that represents not a limitation upon, but an extension of, women's
natural nurturant response to the dependent, connected other.
The subterranean descriptions of subjectivity that emerge
from the unofficial stories of radical feminism and critical legalism
also contrast rather than compare. According to the critical legalists, human beings respond to their natural state of physical sepa-
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rateness not with aggression, fear and mutual suspicion, as liberalism holds, but with longing. Men suffer from a perpetual dread
of isolation and alienation and a fear of rejection, and harbor a
craving for community, connection, and association. Women, by
contrast, according to radical feminism, respond to their natural
state of material connection to the other with a craving for individuation and a loathing for invasion. Just as clearly, the subterranean dread men have of alienation (according to critical legalism)
contrasts sharply with the subterranean dread that women have of
invasion and intrusion (according to radical feminism).
The responses of human beings and women to these subterranean desires also contrast in substance, although, interestingly, the
responses are structurally similar. According to both critical legalism and radical feminism, human beings and women, respectively,
for the most part deny the subterranean desires that permeate
their lives. Instead, they collaborate, to some degree, in the official
culture's elaborate attempt to deny while partially accommodating
the intensity of those felt needs. Both do so for the same reason:
both human beings and women deny their subterranean desires because of a fear-legitimately grounded-that the subterranean
need, if asserted, will be met by either violence or rejection by the
dominant culture. The dominant male culture condemns as aberrant the man who needs others, just as the dominant female culture condemns the woman who wants to exist apart from others.
Thus, men deny their need for attachment and women deny their
need for individuation. The mechanisms by which the two groups
effect the denial are fundamentally opposed in substance, albeit
structurally parallel. According to critical theory, human beings
deny their need for attachment primarily through the distancing
and individuating assertion of individual rights. It is the purpose
and content of those rights to largely deny the human need for
attachment and communion with the other. According to radical
feminism, women deny their need for individuation through the
"intimating" mechanisms of romance, sentiment, familial ideology,
the mystique of motherhood, and commitment to the false claims
of affective attachment. It is the purpose and content of romance
and familial ideology to largely deny women's need for individuation, separation, and individual identity.
Somewhat less obviously, the "unofficial" description of subjectivity provided by each side is not simply the equivalent of the
"official" description of the other, although they are often mistaken as such. The mistaken belief that they are is responsible, I
think, for the widespread and confused claim that critical legal
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studies already is feminist because the critical scholars' description
of subjectivity converges with the cultural feminists' description of
subjectivity, and the less widespread but equally confused claim
that radical feminism is "just" liberalism, for the parallel reason.
First, the subjectivity depicted by critical legalism-the craving for connection and the dread of alienation-is not the subjectivity depicted by cultural feminism-the capacity for intimacy,
the ethic of care, and the fear of separation. It is not hard to see
the basis for the confused claim that cultural feminism's depiction
of feminine subjectivity mirrors critical conceptions of the subjective experience of masculinity, though. There are two reasons for
this confused identification. First, as Duncan Kennedy correctly
notes, liberalism is indeed the rhetoric of the status quo. The
description of subjectivity upon which critical legalists insist-"withdrawn selves" who cringe from autonomy and secretly
crave community-contrasts sharply with the description of subjectivity endorsed by dominant, mainstream liberal ideology. The
critics' description of subjective life is not well regarded by people
in power, to put the point lightly. Indeed, it is somewhat despised.
Vis-a-vis liberal ideology, it is truly radical. It is underground.
Similarly, women and women's values, to put the point lightly, are
underground, despised, opposed, or at best undervalued by people
in power. Vis-a-vis feminism, cultural feminism may be "dominant," but vis-a-vis liberalism, cultural feminism is at least as
deeply underground and disapproved as critical legalism, if not
more so. Cultural feminism and critical legalism share the outsider's status.
Further, the potential for connection which women naturally
have and which cultural feminism celebrates, is in a sense the goal
of critical legalism's alienated hero. For that reason, perhaps, the
critical description of subjectivity may be confusedly identified as
feminist. Nevertheless, the identification is over-stated. Unger explains the human being's natural goal of connection, or "natural
harmony" in this way:
In what sense and to what extent can.., natural harmony be
achieved by man? Take first the problem of reconciliation to
the nonhuman world. The moral, artistic, and religious traditions of many cultures emphasize the persistence of men's desire to see themselves as members of a community of natural,
and, above all, of living things.
Because of its sexual aspect, love helps man overcome the
distinction between self and nature within his own person. As
a conscious and indeterminate being, he is distinguished by

The University of Chicago Law Review

[55:1

his relative freedom from the instincts or natural inclinations.
These inclinations are the natural element within him. Insofar
as he undergoes them, he is a natural being, and, insofar as he
isfree from them, he is more than a natural being. The natural inclinations, like the drives for food and sex, appear as a
tyrannical fate; they impose limits and demands on what consciousness can accomplish.
But in love, the union of persons, which represents an
ideal of the relation between self and others, is consummated
through the natural inclination of sex. It is not the case in
love that the more a man is a natural being, the less is he
distinctively human. On the contrary, the gap between mind
and natural disposition is bridged. By satisfying the ideal of
his relation with others and thereby becoming more human,
he also becomes more completely natural.4 6
But Unger's explanation reveals the difference, not the sameness, between the intimacy women value and the "connection" that
men seek. Women do not value love and intimacy because it "helps
us overcome the distinction between self and nature." On the contrary, women value love and intimacy because they express the
unity of self and nature within our own selves. More generally,
women do not struggle toward connection with others, against
what turn out to be insurmountable obstacles. Intimacy is not
something which women fight to become capable of. We just do it.
It is ridiculously easy. It is also, I suspect, qualitatively beyond the
pale of male effort. The difference might be put pictorially: the intimacy women value is a sharing of intersubjective territory that
preexists the effort made to identify it. The connection that I suspect men strive for does not preexist the effort, and it is not a
sharing of space; at best it is an adjacency. Gilligan inadvertently
sums the difference between the community critical legal studies
insists that men surreptitiously seek, and the intimacy that cultural feminism insists that women value: "The discovery now being
celebrated by men in mid-life of the importance of intimacy, relationships, and care is something that women have known from the
' 47
beginning.
Similarly, the dread of alienation that (according to critical legal studies) permeates men's lives is not the same as the fear of
isolation and separation from the other that characterizes women's

4U
47

Unger, Knowledge and Politics at 205-06 (cited in note 3).
Gilligan, In a Different Voice at 17 (cited in note 13).
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lives. The fear of separation, for women, is fundamental, physical,
economic, empathic, and psychological, as well as psychic. Separation from one's infant will kill the infant to whom the mother has
been physically and then psychically connected, and therefore a
part of the mother will die as well; separation from one's community may have similarly life threatening consequences. The alienation men dread is not the fear that oneself or the one with whom
one is in symbiosis will be threatened. The alienation that men
dread is a sorrow over a fundamental, basic, "first" existential
state of being. The longing to overcome alienation is a socially constructed reaction against the natural fact of individuation. More
bluntly-love, for men, is an acquired skill; separation (and therefore autonomy) is what comes naturally. The separation that endangers women, by contrast, is what is socially constructed-attachment is natural. Separation, and the dread of it, is
the response to the natural (and pleasant) state of connection.
Second, the description of women's subjective nature, aspirations, and fears drawn by radical feminism is not the same as the
description of "human nature" employed by liberalism. It is not
hard, however, to see the basis for this confusion. Both radical
feminism and liberalism view the other as a danger to the self: liberalism identifies the other as a threat to autonomy and to life itself; radical feminism identifies the other as a threat to individuation and to physical integrity. It is hardly surprising, then, that
radical feminists borrow heavily from liberalism's protective armor
of rights and distance. From the radical feminist point of view,
"liberal rights-talk," so disparaged by critical legalists, is just fine,
and it would be even better if it protected women against the dangers that characterize their lives, as well as protecting men against
the dangers that characterize their lives.
The structural similarity ends there, though. The invasion and
intrusion that women dread from the penetrating and impregnating potential of the connected other is not the same as the annihilation and frustration by the separate other that men fear. Men's
greatest fear is that of being wiped out-of being killed. The fear
of sexual and fetal invasion and intrusion that permeates women's
lives is not the fear of annihilation or frustration. The fear of sexual and fetal invasion is the fear of being occupied from within,
not annihilated from without; of having one's self overcome, not
ended; of having one's own physical and material life taken over by
the pressing physical urgency of another, not ended by the conflicting interests of another; of being, in short, overtaken, occupied,
displaced, and invaded, not killed. Furthermore, the intrusiveness
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of less damaging forms of intimacy-"wanted" intimacy-is not
equivalent to the lesser form of annihilation liberalism recognizes:
having one's ends frustrated by the conflicting ends of the other. I
do not fear having my "ends" frustrated; I fear having my ends
"displaced" before I even formulate them. I fear that I will be refused the right to be an "I" who fears. I fear that my ends will not
be my own. I fear that the phrase "my ends" will prove to be (or
already is) oxymoronic. I fear I will never feel the freedom, or have
the space, to become an ends-making creature.
Similarly, the individuation prized by radical feminism is not
the same as the autonomy liberalism heralds, although it may be a
precondition of it. The "autonomy" praised by liberalism is one's
right to pursue one's own ends. "Individuation," as understood by
radical feminism, is the right to be the sort of creature who might
have and then pursue one's "own" ends. Women's longing for individuation is a longing for a transcendent state of individuated being against that which is internally contrary, given, fundamental,
and first. Autonomy is something which is natural to men's existential state and which the state might protect. Individuation, by
contrast, is the material pre-condition of autonomy. Individuation
is what you need to be before you can even begin to think about
what you need to be free.
These, then, are the differences between the "human beings"
assumed by legal theory and women, as their lives are now being
articulated by feminist theory. The human being, according to legal theory, values autonomy and fears annihilation, while at the
same time he subjectively dreads the alienation that his love of
autonomy inevitably entails. Women, according to feminist theory,
value intimacy and fear separation, while at the same time longing
for the individuation which our fear of separation precludes, and
dreading the invasion which our love of intimacy entails. The
human being assumed or constituted by legal theory precludes the
woman described by feminism.
HI.

FUNDAMENTAL CONTRADICTIONS

In Part Three of this article, I will explore the implications of
the conclusion just offered-that the human being assumed by legal theory precludes the women described-by feminism-for the
development of feminist jurisprudence. Before doing so, however, I
want to pursue the structural comparison of the descriptions of
subjectivity offered by legal theory and feminist theory one step
further. Both theories appear to offer internally contradictory descriptions of men and women's subjectivity respectively. The "offi-
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cial story" of subjectivity proffered by liberal legalism conflicts
with the account of the subjectivity of separation put forward by
critical legal theory, just as the "official story" of cultural feminism
conflicts with radical feminists' contrasting account of the subjectivity of connection. Neither cultural feminism nor liberal legalism
have generated explanations of the apparently contradictory accounts of subjectivity offered by radical feminism and critical legalism, respectively. Both should do so. Radical feminism and critical legalism, however, have addressed the issue and at
considerable length. I want now to explore those explanations, and
try to improve on them.
One explanation of the divergence between official value and
subjective life that appears in both radical feminist thought and in
critical legal theory centers on the psychoanalytic concept of denial. A second explanation, which also appears in both critical legalism and radical feminism, centers on the Gramscian and Marxist concept of legitimation and apology. A possible third
explanation of the same phenomenon, which appears in critical legal theory but not in feminism, centers on Duncan Kennedy's provocative notion of a "fundamental contradiction." I wish to endorse this third explanation, and suggest how it might fruitfully be
applied to some of the contradictions that presently plague feminist theory. First, though, I will explore the first two explanations,
and explain why I think they fail in both radical feminist theory
and critical theory, although my focus will be on feminism.
The first explanation for the contradiction between official
value and subjective life that recurs in both critical legal theory
and in radical feminism centers on the psychoanalytic concept of
"denial", and its political corollary, "collaboration." Thus, both
Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon (and numerous other
radical feminists) have argued that the high regard in which
women hold physical, heterosexual intimacy constitutes a form of
denial, bad faith, and, ultimately, collaboration with patriarchy.
Dworkin presents the argument in its greatest detail. Women claim
to find intimacy in intercourse, Dworkin argues, because women
must, after all, "have something." Women claim to enjoy intercourse (and mislabel it as "intimacy") because women have become "alienated from freedom" as a result of our fear of self-assertion. This fear is not groundless-it is based for the most part on
all-too-accurate memories of either threatened or actual violent reactions to an attempted asserting of sexual independence. But it is
nevertheless a form of cowardice. Women who claim to value heterosexual intimacy deny their desire for freedom because they fear
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a reenactment of a primary, and extremely painful experience of
violent, sexual oppression. In a word, they collaborate:
There is the initial complicity, the acts of self-mutilation, selfdiminishing, self-reconstruction, until there is no self, only the
diminished, mutilated reconstruction. It is all superficial and
unimportant, except what it costs the human in her to do it:
except for the fact that it is submissive, conforming, giving up
an individuality that would withstand object status or defy it.
Something happens inside; a human forgets freedom; a human
learns obedience; a human, this time a woman, learns how to
goose-step the female way. . . . So the act goes beyond complicity to collaboration; but collaboration requires a preparing
of the ground, an undermining of values and vision and dignity, a sense of alienation from the worth of other human beings-and this alienation is fundamental to females who are
objectified because they do not experience themselves as
human beings.... Being an object for a man means being
alienated from other women-those like her in status, in inferiority, in sexual function. Collaboration by women with
men to keep women civilly and sexually inferior has been one
of the hallmarks of female subordination; we are ashamed
when Freud notices it, but it is true.4 s
Critical theorist Peter Gabel has given a perfectly parallel explanation of the attraction of autonomous, rights-focused, individuated liberal values in spite of the acutely painful longing for connection which in fact permeates men's lives. Gabel's argument
structurally compares with Dworkin's, although it contrasts with it
substantively. Thus, whereas Dworkin argues that women deny
their desire for freedom, and distance themselves from it through a
false commitment to intimacy, Gabel argues that human beings
deny their craving for attachment with the other, and distance
themselves from it through a false commitment to rights. As
women deny their desire for freedom because of a fear that by asserting that desire they risk violent invasion, so human beings, according to Gabel, deny their desire for attachment because they
fear that by exposing their deeper and truer need for connection,
they will leave themselves vulnerable to the pain of rejection. This
fear is rooted in an unconsciously embedded memory from infancy,
just as women's fear of their own desire for freedom is rooted in a
memory of male violence. At some point in early infancy, according
4' Dworkin,

Intercourse at 141-42 (cited in note 42).
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to Gabel, the other (read: the mother) rejected him. That rejection
was painful and humiliating. The individual denies his need for
connection because he refuses to risk the reenactment of such a
painful, humiliating, and embarrassing rejection, just as the woman denies her need for physical individuation because she refuses
to risk the reenactment of rape. So instead he creates a false self,
defined by liberal "rights." In a word, he collaborates:
Each of us senses that others are determined to keep themselves at what one might call a threatening distance, desiring
eye contact and yet forbidding this contact.. . . And because

this forbidding distance leads us to mistrust or lose confidence
in the desire of the other, we seek to protect ourselves by installing this same forbidding distance in ourselves. We each
become "one of the others" to each other, thus helping to create the very disconnection that we most wish others would allow us to overcome....
What then is the origin of this mutual mistrust that leads
us to adopt a false self that denies its own falsity? For each of
us individually, this mistrust originates in our childhoods...
through direct relations with parents who themselves were
conditioned within the "circle of collective denial" through
which alienated reciprocities reproduce themselves. As a result of these early experiences of the distancing other, we internalize a memory of loss with which desire itself becomes
permanently associated ...
Thus the source of alienation is not to be found in the
organization of production, or in some particular form of
child-rearing, or in a contradiction between self and other in-'
herent in human nature: it derives instead from the incapacity
of intersubjective desire to transcend the circular and self-reproducing constraint it has imposed upon itself in response to
the fear of loss.49
As Gabel by now must surely be aware, his account of the
source of "our" alienation from the other is deeply gendered. 0 The
story he tells of attachment, separation, longing, rejection, repression, humiliation and then alienation is a story of male development, not female. But structurally, his argument is not at all
" Gabel, 62 Tex.L.Rev. at 1567-69 (cited in note 11)(citations omitted).

50 Gabel briefly alludes to, but then dismisses, an alternative feminist explanation in
footnote 12, 62 Tex.L.Rev. at 1568. Conversations with Marcy Wilder and Toni Fitzpatrick
(Stanford Law School '88) have helped me see the gender bias in Gabel's work.
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gendered. Dworkin's and Gabel's arguments employ precisely the
same logical structure. Dworkin, like Gabel, argues that women engage in massive denial, identification, and collaboration with the
powers that cause their alienation. In fact, Gabel's account of male
denial of the need for attachment is the structural mirror, although
the substantive negative, of Dworkin's account of women's denial
of the need for individuation.
Both Gabel's and Dworkin's explanations, I believe, are ultimately unsatisfying, and although they are exploring substantively
opposed phenomena, they are unsatisfying for the same reason.
Both claims fail to do justice to the complexity of the phenomenology that they are seeking to explain. Others have argued, and I
think persuasively, that Gabel's explanation of the disempowered's
"collaborative" embrace of rights fails to capture the phenomenological experience of rights as an empowering and even communitarian tool for disempowered peoples. 1 I will not pursue that argument here. I do want to argue, though, that Dworkin's parallel
insistence that women's enjoyment of heterosexual intercourse
constitutes a form of collaboration fails to capture the phenomenological experience of intercourse as one of positive intimacy, rather
than an experience that is inevitably destructive of "all that is creative within us." Women often, and perhaps increasingly, experience heterosexual intercourse as freely chosen intimacy, not invasive bondage. A radicalism that flatly denies the reality of such a
lived experience runs the risk of making itself unintelligible and
irrelevant to all people, not to mention the audience that matters
most: namely, those women for whom intercourse is not free, not
chosen, and anything but intimate, and who have no idea that it
either could be or should be both.
This "critique of the intimacy critique" can easily be misconstrued-as can the "critique of the rights critique." I am not denying that heterosexuality is compulsory in this culture or that
women as a consequence of that compulsion become alienated
from their desire for freedom. It is indeed true, as the lesbian-feminist poet Adrienne Rich argued some time ago, that both heterosexuality and heterosexual intercourse are compulsory. But heterosexuality is compulsory because of the institutions that render it
compulsory, not because of the nature of the act. The same is true
5'See, e.g., Patricia Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructed Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 Harv.Civ.Rts.-Civ.Liberties Law Review 401 (1987) and Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22
Harv.Civ.Rts.-Civ.Liberties Law Review 301 (1987).
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of motherhood and pregnancy. Because they are compulsory,
motherhood and heterosexuality are tremendously constraining,
damaging, and oppressive. It is indeed true that the institutions
which render them such need to be, ought to be, and will be destroyed. But it does not follow from any of this that either motherhood or intercourse themselves will be, need to be, or ought to be
destroyed. As Rich has argued of mothering,
To destroy the institution is not to abolish motherhood. It is
to release the creation and sustenance of life into the same
realm of decision, struggle, surprise, imagination, and conscious intelligence, as any other difficult, but freely chosen,
work. 2
Similarly, to destroy the "institution" of heterosexual intercourse
is not to abolish intercourse. Rather, it is to "release" it into the
same realm of decision, struggle, surprise, imagination, and conscious intelligence as any other freely chosen "form"-not of work,
as is the case of motherhood-but of intimacy, love, and play.
Now, it is also true-emphatically true-that neither motherhood nor intercourse have been "released" from patriarchy. Until
they are, there is no project more vital to our understanding of
women's present oppression than the description of the subjective
experience of motherhood, and of intercourse, within the patriarchical institutions that render those activities compulsory.
This is the importance of Rich's multi-textured work on compulsory motherhood and heterosexuality, and of Dworkin's passionate
but disappointingly unidimensional work on intercourse. We need
to be aware-to be made aware-of those institutions as institutions that constrain as they define the act. But, as Rich clearly saw
with respect to mothering, that is not all we need to understand.
Feminists also need to understand what it means to mother and to
enjoy intercourse within aspirational conditions of freedom, for it
is those conditions which potentially and increasingly, for many of
us, define the nature of those events. When we reach this understanding, or at least strive for it, we will have a better understanding of what non-institutional and non-patriarchal intercourse and
motherhood might be and might ultimately become.
Of course, to again borrow from Rich, to catch even a glimpse
of mothering or intercourse within a non-patriarchal culture requires a "quantum leap" of imagination. It requires, most of all,
the ability to imagine ourselves in a society in which women are in
52

Rich, On Lies, Secrets, and Silence at 272 (cited in note 24).
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full possession of our bodies:
[T]he "quantum leap" [of imagination] implies that even as
we try to deal with backlash and emergency, we are imagining
the new: a future in which women are powerful, full of our
own power, not the old patriarchal power-over but the powerto-create, power-to-think, power-to-articulate and concretize
our visions and transform our lives and those of our children.
I believe . . . that this power will begin to speak in us more
and more as we repossess our own bodies, including the decision to mother or not to mother, and how, and with whom,
and when. For the struggle of women to become self-determining is rooted in our bodies, and it is an indication of this
that the token women artist or intellectual or professional has
so often been constrained to deny her female physicality in
order to enter realms designated as male domain. 3
Yet we make small versions of these "quantum leaps" every
day. We continue to mother and to want to mother in spite of the
compulsory nature of institutional motherhood. We also make
small versions of the same "quantum leap" with respect to intercourse. Women do, increasingly, freely engage in heterosexual intercourse in spite of the compulsory nature of the institution of
intercourse. Increasingly, we have a sense of what intercourse feels
like when "released" from compulsory heterosexuality. Explanations that rest on denial of the possibility that equality and freedom can define intercourse and motherhood fail to incorporate real
glimpses that we increasingly have of a world without the present
oppresive institutions. They consequently endanger the seriousness
and the truth of the radical feminist insight that many women,
indeed most women, define their intimate relationships within the
confines of necessity rather than possibility, and within the dictates of compulsion, rather than choice.
The second possible explanation of contradiction between the
official story and true subjectivity centers on the Gramscian and
Marxist concept of legitimation and apology. Thus, Catharine
MacKinnon argues that "intimacy" simply legitimates invasion,
and that cultural feminism's celebration of intimacy is, in essence,
simply apology for patriarchy:
For women to affirm difference, when difference means dominance, as it does with gender, means to affirm the qualities
53 Id. at 271-72.
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and characteristics of powerlessness....
So I am critical of affirming what we have been, which
necessarily is what we have been permitted, as if it is
women's, ours, possessive....
I do not think that the way women reason morally is morality "in a different voice." I think it is morality in a higher
register, in the feminine voice. Women value care because
men have valued us according to the care we give them, and
we could probably use some. Women think in relational terms
because our existence is defined in relation to men. .

.

. All I

am saying is that the damage of sexism is real, and reifying
that into differences is an insult to our possibilities. 4
This explanation has a parallel in critical legal theory. According to critical legalists, the dominant class legitimates the oppressive reality of alienation by relabelling alienation as freedom, just
as cultural feminism, according to MacKinnon, relabels invasion as
intimacy. Indeed, it is a recurrent claim in critical legal theory that
the rhetoric of autonomy and freedom found in nineteenth century
contract law, like the rhetoric of good faith and fulfilled expectations in twentieth century contract law, all operate to deny the
true human need for connection and collectivity:
The legitimating image of classical contract law in the nineteenth century was the ideal of free competition as the consequence of wholly voluntary interactions among many private
persons, all of whom were in their nature free and equal to
one another. .

.

. [T]his was denial and apology. It did not

take account of the practical limitations on market freedom
and equality arising from class position or unequal distribution of wealth. It also ignored other meanings of freedom and
equality having to do with the realization of human spirit and
potential through work and community. The legitimation of
the free market was achieved by seizing upon a narrow economic notion of freedom and equality, and fusing it in the
public mind with the genuine meaning.. ..
The central point to understand from this is that contract law
today constitutes an elaborate attempt to conceal what is going on in the world. .

.

. Contemporary capitalism is a coer-

Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified 39 (1987).
" Peter Gabel and Jay M. Feinman, Contract Law as Ideology, in David Kairys, ed.,
The Politics of Law 172, 176 (1982)(citation omitted).
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cive system of relationships. . . . [O]ur narrow functional
roles produce isolation, passivity, unconnectedness and impotence. Contract law, like the other images constituted by capitalism, is a denial of these painful feelings and an apology for
the system that produces them.5
Again, both MacKinnon's argument and the parallel critical
legal claim are unsatisfying, and for the same reason. Both claims
fail to do justice to the complexity of the opposing vision they attack. For while it is true that liberalism's commitment to individualism echoes capitalism's legitimating myth of market freedom,
this doesn't come anywhere near the whole story. The commitment
to individualism that pervades part of liberalism and of liberal culture exists in spite of capitalism's actual disdain for true individualism, not because of capitalism's false claim to freedom. Liberalism has always had a radical commitment to a true individualism
which is not in any sense apologist; liberal individualism in at least
some of its historical and modern forms undercuts, rather than
relegitimates, capitalist super-structure. Similarly, women's ethic
of care, and commitment to the value of nurturance and intimacy
celebrated by cultural feminism, exists in spite of patriarchy's contempt for and under-valuation of those values, not because of their
false claim to honor women's separate sphere. While it is of course
true that cultural feminism's celebration of women's ethic of care
echoes patriarchy's celebration of separate spheres, the former is
hardly an apology for the latter. The differences between cultural
feminism and patriarchy are the all-important ones: patriarchy devalues women, and cultural feminism does not. Patriarchy celebrates women's different sphere in order to reinforce women's
powerlessness. Cultural feminism does not.
Critical legal theorists have developed a third account of the
contradiction between liberal values and subjective desire: the contradiction is based on a real, lived contradiction grounded in material, unreconstructed reality. I believe this explanation is the
strongest of the three, though, as far as I know, it has no parallel in
feminist theory. Both Roberto Unger and Duncan Kennedy have
argued, with considerable force, that the "contradiction" between
liberalism's claim that human beings value autonomy and fear the
other-, and critical theory's opposing claim that they desire connection with the other and dread their alienation from him, reflects a
real contradiction in our subjective, material, and natural lives. It
56Id. at 183.
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is not then (solely) the product of either psychoanalytic denial or
Gramscian legitimation. The contradiction is an experiential contradiction, not a logical contradiction. The difference is important.
According to Kennedy, we value both autonomy and connection, and fear both annihilation by the other and alienation from
him, and all for good reason. The other is both necessary to our
continued existence and a threat to that continued existence.
While it is true that the dominant liberal story of autonomy and
annihilation serves to perpetuate the status quo, it does not follow
from that fact that the subjective desires for freedom and security
which those liberal values reify are entirely false. Rather, Kennedy
argues, collectivity is both essential to our identity and an obstacle
to it. We have contradictory desires and values because our essential human condition-physical separation from the collectivity
which is necessary to our identity-is itself contradictory. It is that
essential human condition which carries the seeds of our twin fears
of alienation and annihilation, as well as our twin desires for autonomy and attachment:
Here is an initial statement of the fundamental contradiction:
• . . Others (family, friends, bureaucrats, cultural figures, the
state) are necessary if we are to become persons at all-they
provide us the stuff of our selves and protect us in crucial
ways against destruction. Even when we seem to ourselves to
be most alone, others are with us, incorporated in us through
processes of language, cognition and feeling that are, simply as
a matter of biology, collective aspects of our individuality.
Moreover, we are not always alone. We sometimes experience
fusion with others, in groups of two or even two million, and it
is good rather than a bad experience.
But at the same time that it forms and protects us, the
universe of others (family, friendship, bureaucracy, culture,
the state) threatens us with annihilation and urges upon us
forms of fusion that are quite plainly bad rather than good.
• . . Numberless conformities, large and small abandonments
of self to others, are the price of what freedom we experience
in society. And the price is a high one.5
Roberto Unger provides a more general account of this fundamental contradiction:

17 Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 Buffalo L.Rev.
209, 211-12 (1979).
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The problem to be solved is that of reconciling two primitive
human demands. One is the need to preserve independence
from the outside world. The other demand is the equally basic
need of the self to live in a world transparent to its mind and
responsive to its concerns, a world with which it can therefore
be at one. The situation in which man is at one with nature
though separate from it, in which he has overcome his moral
and cognitive estrangement without losing his independence,
is natural harmony ...
If we take nature for the nonhuman world, natural harmony will be the experience of belonging to that world while
also standing apart from it. This is what Marx seems to have
in mind when he speaks of the condition in which nature is
58
humanized and man naturalized.
This third explanation of the contradiction between liberal
ideology and critical descriptive claims might, of course, just be
wrong. The value the individual places on autonomy and the fear
he claims to have of annihilation may reflect only the effectiveness
of legitimation and apology, or the thoroughness of psychoanalytic
denial. But if Kennedy is wrong, he is wrong in a way that is
shared by the practicing legal culture itself. For as any good law
student knows, on an empirical level Kennedy is clearly right: our
legal doctrine, or at least our legal ideology, does indeed reflect the
contradictory fundamental urges that Kennedy has identified. Any
sufficiently rich statement of any area of legal doctrine quite explicitly reflects both the "official" story of our values as told by
liberal legalism and the "unofficial" story of a sharply contrasting
subjectivity as told by critical theory. If we generalize the point, we
might say that the "Rule of Law" itself reflects the fundamental
contradiction. The Rule of Law itself values and protects our autonomy and minimizes the dangers that are consequent to our vulnerability. That's its official role. But it also has an unofficial, underground, subterranean potentiality, only occasionally recognized,
but nevertheless always there. The Rule of Law is a product of our
dread of alienation from the other and our longing for connection
with him, no less than it is a product of love of autonomy and fear
of annihilation by him. As a consequence, it can be used and occasionally is used to ameliorate the sorrow we feel as a consequence
of our alienation, as well as to protect the autonomy we value
against the very real threat of annihilation.
11
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The strength of Duncan Kennedy's work is that he has not
just asserted the existence of this fundamental contradiction, but
has shown its permeation through a remarkably wide range of legal
materials. The structurally parallel claim in feminist theory that I
think radical feminists should explore, is that women "officially"
value intimacy (and fear separation) in spite of subjective desires
to the contrary not (solely) because of the legitimating power of
patriarchal ideology, nor (solely) because of the power of denial,
but rather, because women's existential and material circumstance
is itself one of contradiction. The potentiality for physical connection with others that uniquely characterizes women's lives has
within it the seeds of both intimacy and invasion, and therefore
women rightly value the former while we dread and fear the latter,
just as the necessity of physical separation, for men, carries within
it the seeds of both intimacy and alienation, and men rightly value
the former and dread the latter. If this is right, then all four accounts of human experience-liberal legalism, critical legalism, cultural feminism and radical feminism-are saying something true
about human experience. Liberal legalism and critical legalism
both describe something true about male experience, and cultural
feminism and radical feminism both describe something true about
female experience. If Kennedy is right, then men simply live with
an experiential contradiction. In a parallel fashion, cultural feminism and radical feminism may both be true although contradictory. The contradiction between them may be experiential rather
than logical. Women may both value intimacy and dread the intrusion and invasion which intimacy implies; and women may both
fear separation and long for the individualization which separation
would bring.
Although Andrienne Rich has argued something like this with
respect to motherhood, no radical feminist has, to my knowledge,
advanced this claim with respect to intercourse. Nor has anyone
advanced the claim with respect to the fear of invasion and the
value of intimacy generally. Andrea Dworkin alludes to the possibility that women may desire and enjoy physical intimacy with
men for admirable reasons only once in her book-long treatise on
intercourse, and even that reference is lodged almost invisibly in a
paragraph whose overriding argument is very much to the contrary. Nevertheless, even that one reference is rich with the suggestion of a fundamental contradiction. Any full analysis of women's
experience of intercourse, I am sure, must develop the essential
contradiction in our experience to which Dworkin alludes (but does
not develop) in this paragraph:
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Women have wanted intercourse to work and have submitted
. . .even though or even when it does not. The reasons have

often been foul, filled with the spiteful but carefully hidden
malice of the powerless. Women have needed what can be gotten through intercourse: the economic and psychological survival; access to male power through access to the male who
has it; having some hold-psychological, sexual, or economic-on the ones who act, who decide, who matter. There
has been a deep, consistent, yet of course muted objection to
what Anais Nin has called "[t]he hunter, the rapist, the one
for whom sexuality is a thrust, nothing more." Women have
also wanted intercourse to work in this sense: women have
wanted intercourse to be, for women, an experience of equality and passion, sensuality and intimacy. Women have a vision of love that includes men as human too; and women want
the human in men, including in the act of intercourse. Even
without the dignity of equal power, women have believed in
the redeeming potential of love. There has been-despite the
cruelty of exploitation and forced sex-a consistent vision for
women of a sexuality based on a harmony that is both sensual
and possible ....

These visions of a humane sensuality based

in equality are in the aspirations of women; and even the
nightmare of sexual inferiority does not seem to kill them.
They also do not amount to much in real life with real
men. There is, instead, the cold fucking, duty-bound or promiscuous; the romantic obsession in which eventual abandonment turns the vagina into the wound Freud claimed it was;
intimacy with men who dread women, coital dread-as Kafka
wrote in his diary, "coitus as punishment for the happiness of
being together.""
Minimally, I want to suggest that feminists should think about
the possibility that the notion of a "fundamental" experienced
contradiction, grounded in the material and existential state of
connection with the other, might help us explain women's subjective lives, as well as close the broadening gap between cultural and
radical feminist theory. The presence of such a contradiction, for
example, explains why some women see the possibility of intimacy
in pornographic depictions of female sexual submission while
others see the threat of invasion (and it would explain why many
1"Dworkin,

Intercourse at 128-29 (cited in note 42)(emphasis added).
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women see both). The presence of a contradiction underlying
women's subjective lives also clarifies the existential basis of many
of the apparent tensions in feminist legal reforms. It explains why
women insist upon and embrace an ethic of care and the right to
have children without economic hardship, while at the same time
fighting for rights of individuation, physical privacy, and freedom.
Finally, it explains the complex relationship between the emerging
feminist legal theory and dominant legal theory: it explains, for example, why legal feminists are both attracted to liberal rights of
individuation, physical privacy, and individual security, and at the
same time are threatened by them. The contradiction explains why
feminists understand, and even sympathize with, critical legal theory's rights critique, but will never endorse it.
That women live with a fundamental contradiction between
invasion and intimacy is much harder to test than the parallel
claim that men live in a fundamental contradiction between autonomy and alienation for this simple reason: the fundamental contradiction that characterizes men's lives is manifested absolutely all
over the place in public life. As Kennedy correctly claims, once we
are sensitized to it, we see the "fundamental contradiction" in art,
literature, music, and, perhaps most emphatically, in virtually
every field of law. The fundamental contradiction that characterizes women's lives (if it does), by contrast, has no outlet. Women
are silent, particularly with respect to the injuries we suffer. This
is, of course, changing: Women speak, write books, compose music,
produce art, drama and dance, and increasingly even legislate, advocate and adjudicate law. But nevertheless, women express their
subjectivity with nowhere near the voice of authority with which
men express theirs. Women's subjectivity, unlike men's subjectivity, is not expressed in the objective world. Women's silence, more
than any other single factor, inhibits the study of women's subjective lives.
We can, though, test the sense of this contradiction against
the evidence of our own experienced lives, if not the evidence of
art, literature and legal doctrine. When I read Carol Gilligan's
book for the first time several years ago, I had an unequivocal
shock of recognition. What she is saying, I thought then and still
think, is important, transformative, empowering, exciting, enlivening, and, most fundamentally, it is simply true. It is true of me,
and was true of my mother, and is true of my sisters. She has described the way I think, what I value, what I fear, how I have
grown, and how I hope to grow. And she has described the moral
lives of the women I know as well. Her book captures what I know
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and have always known but have never been able to claim as my
own moral vision, and what parts of that vision I share with
women generally. When I read Andrea Dworkin's book, I had the
same unequivocal shock of recognition. What Dworkin is saying
about intercourse is important, transformative, empowering, exciting, liberating, enlivening, and most fundamentally, it is simply
true. It is true of me, was true of my mother, and is true of my
sisters. She is describing how I have been debased, victimized, intruded, invaded, harmed, damaged, injured, and violated by intercourse. Yet it also seems undeniably true to me that these two
feminist visions of my subjective life rest on flatly contradictory
premises.
This realization-if it is shared-presents us with a choice. We
can assume that the contradictions in feminist descriptions of our
lives are conceptual, in which case we must look for flawed arguments-we cannot and ought not believe contradictory things. Alternatively, we can start to think about the possibility that the
contradiction in women lives is experientially felt and materially
based. Kennedy's account of the dilemma that contradiction poses
for the legal theorist, I believe, is equally true of the dilemma that
the very different contradiction in women's lives now poses for
feminism:
The acknowledgment of contradiction does not abate the
moral and practical conflict, but it does permit us to make
some progress in characterizing it. At an elementary level, it
makes it clear that it is futile to imagine that moral and practical conflict will yield to analysis in terms of higher level concepts. The meaning of contradiction at the level of abstraction
is that there is no metasystem that would, if only we could
find it, key us into one mode or the other as circumstances
"required." Second, the acknowledgement of contradiction
means that we cannot "balance" individualist and altruist values or rules against equitable standards. . .

The imagery of

balancing presupposes exactly the kind of more abstract unit
of measurement that the sense of contradiction excludes. The
only kind of imagery that conveys the process by which we act
and act and act in one direction, but then reach the sticking
point, is that of existentialist philosophy. We make commitments, and pursue them. The moment of abandonment is no
more rational than that of beginning, and equally a moment

Jurisprudenceand Gender

1988]

of terror.6 0
Of course, there is a major difference between the presence of
contradiction in legal theory and the presence of contradiction in
feminist theory. Even if it is true that women, like men, live within
the parameters of a contradiction, women live within the parameters of this fundamental contradiction within the oppressive conditions of patriarchy.Men don't (although men do live within the
parameters of the oppressive conditions of capitalism). Therefore,
feminists need to develop not just an examination of the experience of the contradiction between invasion and intimacy to which
our potential for connection gives rise, but also a description of
how patriarchy effects, twists, perverts, and surely to some extent
causes that contradiction. We also need, however, to imagine how
the contradiction would be felt outside of patriarchy, and we need
to reflect on our own experiences of non-patriarchal mothering, intercourse, and intimacy to generate such imaginings. For while
women's bodies may continue to be "materially connected" to
others as long as they are women's bodies, they need not forever be
possessed by others. Our connection to the other is a function of
our material condition; our possession by the other, however, is a
function of patriarchy. We need to imagine both having power over
our bodies and power over our contradictory material state. We
need to imagine how this fundamental contradiction would feel
outside of the context of the dangers and fears that patriarchy requires. Adrienne Rich asks, of non-constrained, non-compulsory,
truly chosen motherhood in a world free of patriarchy:
What would it mean to mother in a society where women were
deeply valued and respected, in a culture which was womanaffirming? What would it mean to bear and raise children in
the fullness of our power to care for them, provide for them,
in dignity and pride?. . . What would it mean to mother in a
society which was making full use of the spiritual, intellectual,
emotional, physical gifts of women, in all our difference and
diversity? What would it mean to mother in a society which
laid no stigma upon lesbians, so that women grew up with real
emotional and erotic options in the choice of life companions
and lovers? What would it mean to live and die in a culture
which affirmed both life and death, in which both the living
world and the bodies of women were released at last from centuries of violation and control? This is the quantum leap of
40
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We need to ask these questions of intercourse as well. What
would intercourse feel like, or be, in a world in which it was freely
chosen? What would it mean to have intercourse in a world in
which women's pleasures were honored, and women's injuries were
cared for, and women's labor was compensated? And finally we
need to ask these questions of intimacy generally. How would the
"contradiction" between invasion and intimacy feel in a world free
of the fear of male sexual aggression? Would intimacy be entirely
non-threatening where there was no reason to fear rape? Would
individuation be as enticing where intercourse and motherhood
were not mandatory? Would separation be as harmful where familial association was not the assumed form of women's lives? How
would the contradiction between intimacy and intrusion feel, if we
had no reason to fear the more life threatening forms of invasion?
We need to ask these questions, but we also need to answer them.
The answers, I suspect, must come at least in part from the nonpatriarchal relationships in our own lives. We should not be surprised when, as we look at those lives, we see and feel contradictions, not just within the structures of patriarchy, but behind
them, through them, and beyond them as well.
III. FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE
By the claim that modern jurisprudence is "masculine," I
mean two things. First, I mean that the values, the dangers, and
what I have called the "fundamental contradiction" that characterize women's lives are not reflected at any level whatsoever in contracts, torts, constitutional law, or any other field of legal doctrine.
The values that flow from women's material potential for physical
connection are not recognized as values by the Rule of Law, and
the dangers attendant to that state are not recognized as dangers
by the Rule of Law.
First, the Rule of Law does not value intimacy-its official
value is autonomy. The material consequence of this theoretical
undervaluation of women's values in the material world is that
women are economically impoverished. The value women place on
intimacy reflects our existential and material circumstance; women
will act on that value whether it is compensated or not. But it is
not. Nurturant, intimate labor is neither valued by liberal legalism
nor compensated by the market economy. It is not compensated in
61 Rich, On Lies, Secrets, and Silence at 272-73 (cited in note 24).
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the home and it is not compensated in the workplace-wherever
intimacy is, there is no compensation. Similarly, separation of the
individual from his or her family, community, or children is not
understood to be a harm, and we are not protected against it. The
Rule of Law generally and legal doctrine in its particularity are
coherent reactions to the existential dilemma that follows from the
liberal's description of the male experience of material separation
from the other: the Rule of Law acknowledges the danger of annihilation and the Rule of Law protects the value of autonomy. Just
as assuredly, the Rule of Law is not a coherent reaction to the existential dilemma that follows from the material state of being connected to others, and the values and dangers attendant to that
condition. It neither recognizes nor values intimacy, and neither
recognizes nor protects against separation.
Nor does the Rule of Law recognize, in any way whatsoever,
muted or unmuted, occasionally or persistently, overtly or covertly,
the contradiction which characterizes women's, but not men's,
lives: while we value the intimacy we find so natural, we are endangered by the invasion and dread the intrusion in our lives which
intimacy entails, and we long for individuation and independence.
Neither sexual nor fetal invasion of the self by the other is recognized as a harm worth bothering with. Sexual invasion through
rape is understood to be a harm, and is criminalized as such, only
when it involves some other harm: today, when it is accompanied
by violence that appears in a form men understand (meaning a
plausible threat of annihilation); in earlier times, when it was understood as theft of another man's property. But marital rape, date
rape, acquaintance rape, simple rape, unaggravated rape, or as Susan Estrich wants to say "real rape"8 2 are either not criminalized,
or if they are, they are not punished-to do so would force a recognition of the concrete, experiential harm to identity formation that
sexual invasion accomplishes.
Similarly, fetal invasion is not understood to be harmful, and
therefore the claim that I ought to be able to protect myself
against it is heard as nonsensical. The argument that the right to
abortion mirrors the right of self defense falls on deaf ears for a
reason: the analogy is indeed flawed. The right of self defense is
the right to protect the body's security against annihilation liberally understood, not invasion. But the danger an unwanted fetus
poses is not to the body's security at all, but rather to the body's
62 Susan Estrich, Real Rape (1987).
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integrity. Similarly, the woman's fear is not that the she will die,
but that she will cease to be or never become a self. The danger of
unwanted pregnancy is the danger of invasion by the other, not of
annihilation by the other. In sum, the Rule of Law does not recognize the danger of invasion, nor does it recognize the individual's
need for, much less entitlement to, individuation and independence from the intrusion which heterosexual penetration and fetal
invasion entails. The material consequence of this lack of recognition in the real world is that women are objectified-regardedas
creatures who can't be harmed.
The second thing I mean to imply by the phrase "masculine
jurisprudence" is that both liberal and critical legal theory, which
is about the relation between law and life, is about men and not
women. The reason for this lack of parallelism, of course, is hardly
benign neglect. Rather, the distinctive values women hold, the distinctive dangers from which we suffer, and the distinctive contradictions that characterize our inner lives are not reflected in legal
theory because legal theory (whatever else it's about) is about actual, real life, enacted, legislated, adjudicated law, and women
have, from law's inception, lacked the power to make law protect,
value, or seriously regard our experience. Jurisprudence is "masculine" because jurisprudence is about the relationship between
human beings and the laws we actually have, and the laws we actually have are "masculine" both in terms of their intended beneficiary and in authorship. Women are absent from jurisprudence because women as human beings are absent from the law's
protection: jurisprudence does not recognize us because law does
not protect us. The implication for this should be obvious. We will
not have a genuinely ungendered jurisprudence (a jurisprudence
"unmodified" so to speak) until we have legal doctrine that takes
women's lives as seriously as it takes men's. We don't have such
legal doctrine. The virtual abolition of patriarchy is the necessary
political condition for the creation of non-masculine feminist
jurisprudence.
It does not follow, however, that there is no such thing as feminist legal theory. Rather, I believe what is now inaccurately called
"feminist jurisprudence" consists of two discrete projects. The first
project is the unmasking and critiquing of the patriarchy behind
purportedly ungendered law and theory, or, put differently, the uncovering of what we might call "patriarchal jurisprudence" from
under the protective covering of "jurisprudence." The primary
purpose of the critique of patriarchal jurisprudence is to show that
jurisprudence and legal doctrine protect and define men, not
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women. Its second purpose is to show how women-that is, people
who value intimacy, fear separation, dread invasion, and crave individuation-have fared under a legal system which fails to value
intimacy, fails to protect against separation, refuses to define invasion as a harm, and refuses to acknowledge the aspirations of
women for individuation and physical privacy.
The second project in which feminist legal theorists engage
might be called "reconstructive jurisprudence." The last twenty
years have seen a substantial amount of feminist law reform, primarily in the areas of rape, sexual harassment, reproductive freedom, and pregnancy rights in the workplace. For strategic reasons,
these reforms have often been won by characterizing women's injuries as analogous to, if not identical with, injuries men suffer (sexual harassment as a form of "discrimination;" rape as a crime of
"violence"), or by characterizing women's longing as analogous to,
if not identical with, men's official values (reproductive freedom-which ought to be grounded in a right to individuation-conceived instead as a "right to privacy," which is derivative
of the autonomy right). This misconceptualization may have once
been a necessary price, but it is a high price, and, as these victories
accumulate, an increasingly unnecessary one. Reconstructive feminist jurisprudence should set itself the task of rearticulating these
new rights in such a way as to reveal, rather than conceal their
origin in women's distinctive existential and material state of being. The remainder of this article offers a schematization and criticism of the feminist jurisprudence we have generated to date
under the umbrella concept described above, in spite of patriarchy
and in spite of the masculinity of legal theory. I then suggest further lines of inquiry.
A.

The Critique of Patriarchal Jurisprudence

Structurally, the feminist attempt to describe and critique patriarchal jurisprudence by necessity tracks the methodological divisions in masculine jurisprudence, so I need to make one further
diversion. Masculine jurisprudence is divided internally by a methodological issue which is as definitive and foundational as the substantive issues that divide liberal from critical legalism. Some legal
theorists practice what might be called a "narrative" and "phenomenological" jurisprudential method, (hereinafter, simply narrative) and some practice what might be called an "interpretivist"
method. Narrative and interpretive methodology have adherents in
both liberal and critical legal literature. Thus, if we look at both
substance and method, (instead of just substance) there are not
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two, but four major jurisprudential traditions in legal scholarship.
Liberal legalism can be either interpretive or narrative, as can critical legal theory. Put differently, a narrative methodology can be
either critical or liberal, as can interpretivism.
"Narrative legal theory," whether it be liberal or critical,
moves methodologically from a description of justice, the state of
nature, or of the "human being" which aims for some degree of
generality if not universality, and then tells either a narrative story
about how human beings thus described come to agree on the Rule
of Law, or, alternatively, a phenomenological description of how it
feels to be a person within a legal regime. To the narrative and
phenomenological legal theorists, (whether critical or liberal) the
person, the natural state, and the demands of justice are first, both
historically and phenomenologically. Human beings create the
Rule of Law from the state of nature to comply with the demands
of justice and the narrative theorist tells how and
why."Interpretive" jurisprudence, whether liberal or critical, moves
methodologically in the opposite direction. Interpretive theorists
begin with an interpretation of law, or of a body of legal doctrine,
or of the idea of law itself, and derive from that interpretation an
account of justice. The methodological assumption of interpretive
jurisprudence is that the legal text not only reflects, but to some
degree even defines, what justice requires and hence what a person
is. It is the purpose of interpretive jurisprudence to provide the
best interpretation of the "justice" that the legal text has defined.
Thus, the interpretivist tells the story of justice from the point of
view of the rule of law, rather than the story of the emergence of
"law" from the point of view of human beings under the constraints of justice. While to the narrative theorist, "we" create legal
texts, to the interpretivists, the texts "create" as they define our
moral commitments and hence our view of ourselves, and it is the
theorist's special role to show exactly who it is that the texts have
created.
Putting together substance and method, we can generate a
four-boxed matrix: narrative liberal legalism, interpretive liberal
legalism, narrative critical theory and interpretive critical theory.
The matrix, with representative participants, looks like this:
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NARRATIVE
LIBERAL

Hobbes,
Ackerman,

INTERPRETIVE
Blackstone
R. Dworkin

Rawls

CRITICAL

"Phenomenology
Project" (rights)

D. Kennedy
"Deconstruction

Unger, Gabel

Project"

1. The Narrative and PhenomenologicalCritique.By "the critique of patriarchal jurisprudence" I mean four distinct projects,
which parallel the matrix given above. First, narrative critical jurisprudence aims to provide, in a Hobbesian (or Ungerian) manner,
the material, internal, phenomenological, subjective story of
women's experience of the emergence and present reality of the
Rule of Law. That story goes something like this. Prior to the advent of the "Rule of Law," we might hypothesize, women bore,
breast fed, nurtured and protected children. Women did the nurturant work. As described above, women lived in a "natural web of
hierarchy:" they were profoundly unequal to the infants they
raised. While men responded to their condition of natural equality
with mutual aggression, women responded to their condition of
natural inequality with nurturance and an ethic of care. Women
were at the same time profoundly unequal to men. Prior to the
Rule of Law, women, and only women, were vulnerable to sexual
invasion. As Catharine MacKinnon suggests, on the only "first day
that matters," and this day occurred long before the signing of the
social contract, men established sexual power over women. 3 Thus,
inequality vis-a-vis both children and men, an ethic of care for the
weak, and sexual vulnerability to the male, was women's natural
state, while equality, mutual fear and suspicion was men's.
Then, on day two, came the Rule of Law. According to the
Hobbesian story, the Rule of Law significantly improved the quality of men's lives: men's lives became longer, less nasty, less brutish (even if somewhat more alienated), and more productive. But
not so for women: the same Rule of Law left women's natural lives
intact, worsened her material condition, and reified her sexual vulnerability into a male right of access. The Rule of Law changed the
conditions that uniquely pertained to women in the state of nature, but the change was for the worse: after the Rule of Law,
63
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women are still uniquely capable of intimacy, but newly unrecognized for their nurturant activity in a world that values autonomy
and compensates individuated labor. Similarly, women remain
uniquely vulnerable to invasion, but newly unprotected against
that injury in a world that protects against other injuries. The narrative and phenomenological task for the critique of patriarchal jurisprudence is to tell the story and phenomenology of the human
community's commitment to the Rule of Law from women's point
of view. We need to show what the exclusion of women from law's
protection has meant to both women and law, and we need to show
what it means for the Rule of Law to exclude women and women's
values.
The way to do this-the only way to do this-is to tell true
stories of women's lives. The Hobbesian "story" of deliverance
from the state of nature to the Rule of Law, as both liberal and
radical legal scholars are fond of pointing out, does not purport to
be history. But that doesn't make it fantasy. The Hobbesian story
of the state of nature (and the critical story of alienation as well) is
a synthesis of umpteen thousands of personal, subjective, everyday, male experiences. Images are generated from that synthesis,
and those images, sometimes articulate, sometimes not, of what it
means to be a human being then become the starting point of legal
theory. Thus, for example, the Hobbesian, liberal picture of the
"human being" as someone who treasures autonomy and fears annihilation from the other comes from men's primary experiences,
presumably, of school yard fights, armed combat, sports, games,
work, big brothers, and fathers. Similarly, the critical picture of
the human being as someone who longs for attachment and dreads
alienation comes from the male child's memory of his mother, from
rejection experiences painfully culled from his adolescence, and
from the adult male's continuing inability to introspect, converse,
or commune with the natural world, including the natural world of
others. When Peter Gabel says "Let me start by making a descriptive assertion [about human beings] .. . which seems to me... [to
be] self-evidently true"' 4 and then what follows is a descriptive
statement which is self-evidently untrue of women, he is not simply "mistaken," he is mistaken in a particular (male) way and for a
particular (male) reason. When Hobbes, Ackerman, Dworkin,
Rawls and the rest of the liberal tradition describe the natural
human predicament as one of natural equality and mutual antago, Gabel, 62 Tex.L.Rev. at 1566 (cited in note 11).
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nism, and describe human beingsas inevitably separate and mutually self-interested, thus definitionally excluding pregnant women
and breast-feeding mothers from the species, they also are mistaken in a particular way and for a particular reason. Gabel has
confused his male experience of separation and alienation with
"human" experience, and liberals have confused their male experiences of natural equality, mutual suspicion, fear of annihilation,
and pervasive, through-and-through selfishness with "human" experience, and they have done so because women have not made
clear that our day-to-day, lived experience-of intimacy, bonding,
separation, sexual invasion, nurturance and intrusion-is incommensurable with men's. We need to flood the market with our own
stories until we get one simple point across: men's narrative story
and phenomenological description of law is not women's story and
phenomenology of law. We need to dislodge legal theorists' confidence that they speak for women, and we need to fill the gap that
will develop when we succeed in doing so.
Put phenomenologically, instead of narratively, feminist legal
theorists need to show through stories the value of intimacy-not
just to women, but to the community-and the damage
done-again, not just to women, but to the community-by the
law's refusal to reflect that value. Indeed, I can't imagine any project more crucial, right now, to the survival of this species than the
clear articulation of the importance of love to a well-led public life.
We not only need to show that these values are missing from public life and not rewarded in private life, but we also need to show
how our community would improve if they were valued. We need
to show, (as Suzanna Sherry,6 5 Lynne Henderson,6 6 Martha Minow

7

and others have begun to do), that a community and a judi-

ciary that relies on nurturant, caring, loving, empathic values
rather than exclusively on the rule of reason will not melt into a
murky quagmire, or sharpen into the dreaded spector of
totalitarianism.
On a more local level, we need to show that a law school which
employs, protects, and even compensates for these competencies
will be a better law school. We need to show, (as Martha Fineman
has done in the area of custody decisions6 8 ), that a legal and eco" Sherry, 72 Va.L.Rev. at 584 (cited in note 14); Suzanna Sherry, The Gender of
Judges, 4 Law & Inequality 159 (1986).
" Henderson, Legality and Empathy, Mich.L.Rev. (forthcoming 1987).
67 Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 Harv.L.Rev. 10 (1987).
8 Martha L. Fineman and Anne Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal Poli-
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nomic system which values, protects and rewards nurturant labor
in private life will make for a better community. We need to show
that community, nurturance, responsibility, and the ethic of care
are values at least as worthy of protection as autonomy, self-reliance, and individualism. We must do that, in part, by showing how
those values have affected and enriched our own lives. Similarly,
we need to show-and again, I think we need to do it with stories-how the refusal of the legal system to protect those values
has weakened this community, as it has impoverished our lives.
From a radical point of view, we also need to explain, through
stories, how physical invasion and intrusion harm women, and how
they harm women distinctively. We need to explain, as Susan Estrich, Lynn Henderson and Diana Russell have begun to do, the
danger and the harm of rape that is not seen as rape: invasive marital intercourse and invasive intercourse with "dates."69 We need
to explain how it feels to live entirely outside the protection of
rape law: how it feels to be a wife in a state which defines rape as
the "nonconsensual sexual intercourse by a man with a woman not
his wife;" how it feels to be the person that another person has a
legal right to invade without your consent. We need to provide stories rich enough to show that this harm is not the harm of annihilation protected by the Rule of Law, although it may accompany it.
We need to show that the harm of invasive intercourse is real even
when it does not look like the kind of violence protected by the
Rule of Law. We need to show that invasive intercourse is a danger
even when it cannot be analogized in any way whatsoever to male
experience.
Similarly, we need to explain, as the National Abortion Rights
Action League has begun to do, the harms and dangers of invasive
pregnancy. We need to explain that this harm has nothing to do
with invading the privacy of the doctor-patient relationship, or the
privacy of the family, or the privacy of the marriage; but that
rather, it has to do with invading the physical boundaries of the
body and the psychic boundaries of a life. Finally, we need to provide phenomenological accounts of those ameliorative institutions,
ideologies and psychic constructs that purport to make the invasiveness and intrusiveness of our lives tolerable. Romance, for ex-

cymaking: Custody Determination at Divorce, 1987 Wisc.L.Rev. 107; Martha L. Fineman, A
Reply to David Chambers, 1987 Wisc.L.Rev. 165; Martha L. Fineman, Dominant Discourse,
Professional Language and Legal Change, 101 Harv.L.Rev. (forthcoming 1988).
"' Estrich, Real Rape (cited in note 62); Henderson, Book Review, Berkeley
Women's L.J. (forthcoming 1988); Diana E.H. Russell, Rape in Marriage (1982).
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ample, is one such cluster: just as liberal rights mediate the gulf
between the liberal value of autonomy and the subjective craving
for connection in liberal legalism, so romance mediates the gulf between the feminine value of intimacy and the subjective craving
for individuation. The mystique of femininity is surely another,
and the pornographic imagination is a third. With the exception of
MacKinnon and Dworkin's work on pornography, we haven't done
much of this sort of jurisprudence, and we need to do a lot more.
2. The Interpretive Critique. The purpose of the interpretive
critique of patriarchal jurisprudence complements that of the narrative critique. As the narrative critique explores the Rule of Law
from women's point of view, the interpretive critique aims to explore women from the point of view of the Rule of Law. The interpretive critique shows how patriarchal doctrine constructs, defines,
and delimits women, just as interpretive masculine jurisprudence,
both liberal and critical, aims to provide accounts of how doctrine
constructs, defines, and delimits the human being. For although
women-people who value intimacy and are harmed by invasion-have not been accorded the protection of the Rule of Law,
we have hardly been ignored. Women are not constructed as
human within this system, but we are nevertheless constructed as
something else: as valueless, as objects, as children, or as invisible.
The interpretive critique should aim to articulate what that something else might be. The interpretive critique is a lot like shining a
light on darkness, or proving a negative-it involves looking at
what lies between the images of legalism, instead of looking directly at legalism. The interpretive critique must deconstruct the
images that authoritatively diminish women, sometimes down to
nothing.
On the cultural side of the substantive divide, this means
showing how legalism devalues women, by not valuing what women
value. To name just a few examples, Martha Fineman has tried to
show who and what a "mother" is understood to be in a legal system where nurturant labor is neither recognized nor valued in custody disputes.70 Other interpretive cultural feminists have tried to
show what it means, objectively, not to be paid for housework, for
child-raising, and for relational work in the workplace. On the radical side, this means showing what it means to be objectified.
Again, to take just a few examples, Andrea Dworkin has begun to
70 Martha L. Fineman, Dominant Discourse: The Professional Appropriation of Child
Custody Decision-Making, Institute For Legal Studies, Working Papers Series 2 (April
1987).
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show who the "woman" is defined to be by the pornographer, and
Catharine MacKinnon has begun to show how the First Amendment has defined the pornographer's definition of the woman.7 '
Susan Estrich, Diana Russell, and others have begun to show what
a "wife" is in a legal system which defines rape as the nonconsensual intercourse by a man with a woman not his wife. 2 We need, I
think, to do more of this: most notably, we need to understand
how laws criminalizing abortion construct "motherhood" and how
Roe v. Wade 7 3-which constructs the right to abortion as the product of a need to balance medicinal privacy rights of doctors and
patients against the right to life of a fetus-constructs the female.
Henderson has done some of this work. 4 The matrix I foresee,
with a sample of representative participants, looks like this:
CRITIQUE OF PATRIARCHAL JURISPRUDENCE

Interpretive
Jurisprudence

RADICAL FEMINISM

Sherry and Henderson
(on judging)
Fineman (motherhood)
Dalton (midwives)
DECONSTRUCTION

MacKinnon (first amend)
A. Dworkin (pornography)
Estrich (rape)
PROJECTS

NARAL (Abortion)
Littleton
MacKinnon (sex harass)
Fineman
Estrich (rape)
PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROJECTS
(of romance, porn, etc.)

Narrative
Jurisprudence

B.

CULTURAL FEMINISM

Reconstructive Jurisprudence

The goal of reconstructive feminist jurisprudence is to render
feminist reform rational. We must change the fact that, from a
mainstream point of view, arguments for feminist legal reform efforts are (or appear to be) invariably irrational. The moral questions feminist reforms pose are always incommensurable with dominant moral and legal categories. Let me put it this way: given
71
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present moral categories, women's issues are crazy issues. Arguments for reproductive freedom, for example, are a little insane:
pro-choice advocates can't explain the difference between reproductive freedom and infanticide; or how this right can possibly be
grounded in the Constitution; or how it is that women can claim to
be "nurturant" and at the same time show blatant disregard for
the rights and feelings of fetuses. In fact, my sense, drawn from
anecdotal evidence only, is that the abortion issue is increasingly
used in ethics as well as constitutional law classrooms to exemplify
the "irrationality" of individual moral commitment. Rape reform
efforts that aim to expand the scope of the defined harm are also
perceived, I believe, as insane. Why would anyone possibly object
to non-violent sex? Isn't sex always pleasurable? Feminist pornography initiatives are viewed as irrational, and the surrogate motherhood issue is no better. There's an air of irrationality around
each of these issues.
That air of irrationality is partly real and partly feigned. The
reason for the air of irrationality around particular, substantive
feminist legal reform efforts, I believe, is that feminist legal reforms are by necessity advocated in a form that masks rather than
reflects women's true subjective nature. This is hardly surprising:
language, of course, constrains our descriptive options. But
whether or not surprising, the damage is alarming, and we need to
understand its root. Arguments for reproductive freedom, for example, are irrational because the categories in which such arguments must be cast are reflective of men's, not women's, nature.
This culture thinks about harm, and violence, and therefore self
defense, in a particular way, namely a Hobbesian way, and a
Hobbesian conception of physical harm cannot possibly capture
the gender-specific subjective harm that constitutes the experience
of unwanted pregnancy. From a subjective, female point of view,
an abortion is an act of self defense, (not the exercise of a "right of
privacy") but from the point of view of masculine subjectivity, an
abortion can't possibly be an act of self defense: the fetus is not
one of Hobbes' "relatively equal" natural men against whom we
have a right to protect ourselves. The fetus is unequal and above
all else dependent. That dependency and inequality is the essence
of fetus-hood, so to speak. Self-defense doctrine with its Hobbesian background and overlay simply doesn't apply to such dependent and unequal "aggressors," indeed, the notion of aggression itself does not apply to such creatures.
Rape reform efforts to criminalize simple rape are also irrational, as Susan Estrich has discovered, and for the same reason:
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subjectively, "simple rapes" are harms, but from the point of view
of masculine subjectivity, non-violent acts that don't threaten annihilation or frustration of projects can't possibly be "harmful." In
both cases, we have tried to explain feminist reform efforts through
the use of analogies that don't work and arguments that are
strained. The result in both cases is internally inconsistent, poorly
reasoned, weak, and ultimately vulnerable legal doctrine.
"Reconstructive feminist jurisprudence," I believe, should try
to explain or reconstruct the reforms necessary to the safety and
improvement of women's lives in direct language that is true to our
own experience and our own subjective lives. The dangers of
mandatory pregnancy, for example, are invasion of the body by the
fetus and the intrusion into the mother's existence following childbirth. The right to abort is the right to defend against a particular
bodily and existential invasion. The harm the unwanted fetus does
is not the harm of annihilation, nor anything like it: it is not an
assault, or a battery, or a breached contract, or an act of negligence. A fetus is not an equal in the state of nature, and the harm
a fetus can do is not in any way analogous to that harm. It is,
however, a harm. The fetus is an "other," and it is perfectly sensible to seek a liberal sounding "right" of protection against the
harm the fetus does.
We need, though, to be more accurate in our description of the
harm. Unwanted intercourse is "harmful" because it is invasive,
not because it is (necessarily) violent. For that reason alone, the
harm of intercourse is descriptively incommensurate with liberal
concepts of harm. But it is not incommensurate with women's
lives. The goal of reconstructive feminist jurisprudence should be
to provide descriptions of the "human being" underlying feminist
legal reforms that will be true to the conditions of women's lives.
Our jurisprudential constructs-liberalism and critical theory-might then change as well to account for true descriptions of
women's subjectivity.
CONCLUSION: TOWARD A JURISPRUDENCE UNMODIFIED

The "separation thesis," I have argued, is drastically untrue of
women. What's worth noting by way of conclusion is that it is not
entirely true of men either. First, it is not true materially. Men are
connected to another human life prior to the cutting of the umbilical cord. Furthermore, men are somewhat connected to women
during intercourse, and men have openings that can be sexually
penetrated. Nor is the separation thesis necessarily true of men existentially. As Suzanna Sherry has shown, the existence of the en-
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tire classical republican tradition belies the claim that masculine
biology mandates liberal values.7 5 More generally, as Dinnerstein,
Chodorow, French, and Gilligan all insist, material biology does
not mandate existential value: men can connect to other human
life. Men can nurture life. Men can mother. Obviously, men can
care, and love, and support, and affirm life. Just as obviously, however, most men don't. One reason that they don't, of course, is
male privilege. Another reason, though, may be the blinders of our
masculinist utopian visionary. Surely one of the most important
insights of feminism has been that biology is indeed destiny when
we are unaware of the extent to which biology is narrowing our
fate, but that biology is destiny only to the extent of our ignorance. As we become increasingly aware, we become increasingly
free. As we become increasingly free, we, rather than biology, become the authors of our fate. Surely this is true both of men and
women.
On the flip side, the "connection thesis" is also not entirely
true of women, either materially or existentially. Not all women
become pregnant, and not all women are sexually penetrated.
Women can go through life unconnected to other human life.
Women can also go through life fundamentally unconcerned with
other human life. Obviously, as the liberal feminist movement
firmly established, many women can and do individuate, speak the
truth, develop integrity, pursue personal projects, embody freedom, and attain an atomistic liberal individuality. Just as obviously, most women don't. Most women are indeed forced into
motherhood and heterosexuality. One reason for this is utopian
blinders: women's lack of awareness of existential choice in the
face of what are felt to be biological imperatives. But that is surely
not the main reason. The primary reason for the stunted nature of
women's lives is male power.
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to the creation of a feminist jurisprudence is that feminist jurisprudence must simultaneously
confront both political and conceptual barriers to women's freedom. The political barrier is surely the most pressing. Feminists
must first and foremost counter a profound power imbalance, and
the way to do that is through law and politics. But jurisprudence-like law-is persistently utopian and conceptual as well as
apologist and political: jurisprudence represents a constant and at
least at times a sincere attempt to articulate a guiding utopian vi-
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sion of human association. Feminist jurisprudence must respond to
these utopian images, correct them, improve upon them, and participate in them as utopian images, not just as apologies for patriarchy. Feminism must envision a post-patriarchal world, for without such a vision we have little direction. We must use that vision
to construct our present goals, and we should, I believe, interpret
our present victories against the backdrop of that vision. That vision is not necessarily androgynous; surely in a utopian world the
presence of differences between people will be cause only for celebration. In a utopian world, all forms of life will be recognized,
respected and honored. A perfect legal system will protect against
harms sustained by all forms of life, and will recognize life affirming values generated by all forms of being. Feminist jurisprudence must aim to bring this about and, to do so, it must aim to
transform the images as well as the power. Masculine jurisprudence must become humanist jurisprudence, and humanist jurisprudence must become a jurisprudence unmodified.

